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Exploring the Political Roles of the Family:
Justifications for Permanency Planning

for Children
David J. Herring*

I. INTRODUCTION
A recent letter to the editor of the New York Times tells a story that,
although tragic, is not unusual:
I recently encountered the case of a 6-year-old Hispanic girl
named Judy, who has been with her foster mother since the age
of I month. She had been immediately placed into foster care
because traces of heroin were discovered in her blood at birth.
Shortly after Judy's birth, her biological mother was
incarcerated for two and a half years for the sale of drugs.
Following her release from prison, Judy's biological mother
engaged her foster mother in a legal battle for custody of the
child.
The case remained unresolved in the courts for three years, but
custody was eventually granted to Judy's biological mother.
This 6-year-old continues to live with her foster mother, whom
she loves very much and calls "mommy." Judy visits with her
biological mother each weekend, but she indicates she has no
meaningful emotional connection with her. She dreads these
get-togethers and adds that her biological mother frequently
yells at her and hits her on the head and the arm (her foster
mother has never used corporal punishment).
Next June (when Judy will be 7 years old), she will be
permanently placed with her biological mother (whom she has
never lived with). Judy's foster mother said, tearfully, that "it
feels like half of me is being ripped away." Lately, Judy has
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1987-1990, David Herring taught in the Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the University of
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been waking up in the night crying and feeling terrified about
having to leave the only mother she's known.'
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine described the equally unsettled life of a young boy in that state's child welfare system:
Daniel C. was born August 4, 1971. . . . [His father was in
prison and his mother was placed in a mental health facility
soon after Daniel's birth. The Department of Human Services
sought termination of parental rights, but Daniel's father
contested the termination. At the termination hearing, the]
District Court heard evidence that Daniel began to develop
problems in 1979. Expert testimony indicated that Daniel
experienced psychological and emotional problems due to
anxiety concerning the lack of a permanent family relationship.
These problems deepened over the next two years leading to a
diagnosis in July of 1981 of anorexia nervosa. A psychiatrist
who treated Daniel testified that this disorder had caused an
abnormal drop in Daniel's weight and that the condition could
be fatal. After intensive treatment as well as reassurance that his
foster parents were seeking to adopt him, Daniel began to
improve. At the time of the termination [of parental rights]
hearing, Daniel was 11 years old and had been in foster care
since he was 15 months old, including eight and one-half years
with the present foster family. 2
These narratives provide insight into the all-too-typical functioning
of state foster care systems and the trauma that many children expe-3
rience while trapped in these systems for extended periods of time.
Indeed, the children described above were luckier than many children
placed in the foster care system because their foster care placements
remained relatively stable.4 These accounts illustrate the widespread
failure of state child welfare systems to implement reforms based on
the goal of achieving timely, permanent placements for children.' The
weaknesses of the traditional justifications for implementing perma-

1. David Ilson, Because of Foster Care System, a Child Wakes at Night Crying, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at A24.

In re Daniel C., 480 A.2d 766, 767-68 (Me. 1984).
See Ronald H. Rooney, Permanency Planning: Boon for All Children?, 27 Soc.
WORK 152, 152 (1982) (discussing common criticisms leveled against the foster care
system).
4. See Tina L. Rzepnicki, Recidivism of Foster Children Returned to Their Own
Homes: A Review and New Directions for Research, 61 SOC. SERv. REV. 56, 65 (1987)
(citing foster care recidivism as a probable cause of the 14% increase in foster care
entries between 1982 and 1983).
5. See llson, supra note 1, at A24 (concluding that the current foster care system
often victimizes the very children it is supposed to protect).
2.
3.
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nency planning concepts 6 contribute to this need for reform.
This Article discusses a new set of justifications for implementing
child welfare system reforms, based on the goal of achieving timely
permanent placements for children. These new justifications stem
from an exploration of the family's political roles in America's political
system and in our democratic society. Part II of this Article discusses
the permanency planning reform movement and its achievements. 7
Part IIl addresses the traditional justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts, which emanated from child development
principles, social work practice concepts, economic principles, and the
racial makeup of the child welfare populations.8 Part IV sets forth
possible reasons for the failure of legal decision-makers 9 to implement
permanency planning concepts in their child welfare cases.' ° Part V
explores four political roles of the family and the justifications they
provide for implementing permanency planning concepts." This
Article concludes that only one of the political justifications provides a
relatively strong basis for the implementation of permanency 2planning
concepts on both a philosophical level and a pragmatic level.'
II. THE PERMANENCY PLANNING REFORM MOVEMENT
Over the last two decades, permanency planning concepts have led
to fundamental changes in child welfare laws and practices.' 3 Initially,
6. Permanency planning has been defined as "the systematic process of carrying
out, within a brief time-limited period, a set of goal-directed activities designed to help
children live in families that offer continuity of relationships with nurturing parents or
caretakers and the opportunity to establish life-time relationships." ANTHONY N.
MALUCCIO ET AL., PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN:

CONCEPTS AND METHODS 5

(1986) (quoting Anthony N. Maluccio & Edith Fein, Permanency Planning: A
Redefinition, 62 CHILD WELFARE 195, 197 (1983)).
7. See infra part II.
8. See infra part III.
9. For the purposes of this Article, the term "legal decision-makers" refers to judges
and attorneys who are involved directly, often daily, in counseling clients and making
judicial decisions in civil child protection proceedings conducted within the juvenile
dependency court system. The term does not include decision-makers at the legislative,
administrative, or other public policy levels.
10. See infra part IV.
11. See infra part V.
12. See infra part VI.
13. See MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 3-16; Edith Fein & Anthony N. Maluccio,
Permanency Planning: Another Remedy in Jeopardy?,66 Soc. SERV. REV. 335, 335-37
(1992) (discussing development of permanency planning); Leroy H. Pelton, Beyond
Permanency Planning: Restructuring the Public Child Welfare System, 36 Soc. WORK
337, 338 (1991) (discussing some of the effects of permanency planning); Rooney,
supra note 3, at 156; Rzepnicki, supra note 4, at 58. See generally Alice C. Shotton,
Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL.
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permanency planning had one goal: to achieve timely, permanent
placements for children. 14 Social work concepts that grew out of this
simple goal have had a profound effect on casework practice. 5
Public child welfare agencies now train caseworkers to: (1) address
the child's need for a stable, permanent home from the very beginning
of the case; 16 (2) formulate case service plans 7 in a timely manner by
identifying the parenting problems that brought the child to the welfare
agency's attention initially;' 8 (3) provide services to parents and children that are designed to achieve swift family reunion;' 9 and (4) review
and revise case service plans periodically 20 based on the parents' progress or lack of progress toward solving the specifically identified
parenting problems.2 '
Caseworkers are now trained to reexamine the permanent placement
goal regularly, throughout their work with the family.2 2 The caseworker's ultimate goal is to achieve a safe, permanent placement for
the child in a timely manner to meet the child's developmental needs.23
W. L. REV. 223 (1989-90) (discussing how the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.), a key component of the permanency planning movement, impacted the
field of child welfare).
14. Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 336. The concept of permanency planning
initiated during an Oregon study. JANET LAHTI ET AL., REGIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR
HUMAN SERVS., PORTLAND STATE UNIV. (1978).
15. Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 336-37.
16. See Rooney, supra note 3, at 153-55 (discussing several model projects and the
goals of those projects).
17. A "case plan" is defined as a written document which includes, among other
things, a discussion of the appropriateness of the type of home or institution in which a
child is to be placed. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. See Linda Katz, Effective Permanency Planningfor Children in Foster Care, 35
SOC. WORK 220, 221 (1990) (discussing the practice of providing services to parents,
forming contracts with parents, and visiting parents to check their progress).
19. Rzepnicki, supra note 4, at 58.
20. Katz, supra note 18, at 221. For example, in Michigan, caseworkers must revise
case plans every three months. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A.18f(5) (West 1993). In
Pennsylvania, caseworkers must revise case plans every six months. 55 PA. CODE
§ 3130.63 (1994).
21. MARK HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING REFORM: ONE
COURT THAT WORKS 40-42 (1992); see JOAN BARTHEL, FOR CHILDREN'S SAKE: THE
PROMISE OF FAMILY PRESERVATION (Edna McConnell Clark Foundation 1992) (evaluating
family preservation movement); Katz, supra note 18, at 221 (listing methods and goals
of permanency planning); MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 3-13. See generally LINDA
KATZ, SEEING KIDS THROUGH TO PERMANENCE: COURTWISE (1988) (suggesting a
partnership between social agencies and lawyers to effectuate successful case planning).
Although the effectiveness of family preservation programs has been questioned by
several recent studies, these programs have grown at a rapid pace. BARTHEL, supra.
22. HARDIN, supra note 21, at 40-42.
23. See MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 66-76; Katz, supra note 18, at 226
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Permanent placements include, in order of preference, reunification
with biological parents, adoption, legal guardianship, or formally
planned long-term foster care.24 According to permanency planning
principles, long-term placements are preferred to "temporary foster
care," 25 and caseworkers should seek placements closest in form to a
permanent, autonomous family.26
In addition to changes in casework practice, permanency planning
concepts brought about fundamental changes in child welfare laws.
The 1980 enactment of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act (the "CWA"),27 indicated the power of permanency planning concepts in the legislative arena. Congress enacted the CWA
(concluding that timely permanent placement could become a reality).
One commentator has delineated the time frames in which children need to be placed
permanently. Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:
Standardfor Removal of Childrenfrom Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children
in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 690-91
(1976). Professor Michael Wald, after reviewing relevant literature from the field of
child development psychology, concluded that children under three years of age require
permanent placements within six months of removal from the parental home, whereas
children three years of age and older require permanent placements within one year of
removal. Id.
Federal law requires a dispositional hearing to decide the child's permanent placement
18 months after removal. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Various state
laws require permanency hearings or the termination of rehabilitative services within 12
to 18 months of removal. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19a (West 1993)
(requiring permanency hearing within 364 days of removal); W. VA. CODE §§ 49-6-5 to
49-6D-3 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (limiting rehabilitative services to 12 months).
One commentator has questioned the need for complete severance of parental rights
(including all visitation rights) for children who cannot be returned to the custody of
their parents within these time frames. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental
Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1983) [hereinafter Garrison, Parental Rightsl. However,
there is general agreement concerning the children's needs for permanent placements
within a time period that meets their developmental needs. Id. at 424; see also Marsha
Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75
GEO. L.J. 1745, 1821-26 (1987) [hereinafter Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking]
(proposing automatic initiation of termination petition after three years in placement).
24. See MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
25. For the purposes of this Article, the term "temporary foster care" means the
placement of a child in foster care intended and designed to be temporary. In this regard,
the official plan of the state child welfare agency is either to move the child out of the
foster care placement as soon as it is possible to return the child to a biological parent,
or to place the child in an adoptive home. Temporary foster care does not include
placement in foster care that is officially planned to last until the child becomes an
adult. This type of formally planned long-term foster care is a type of low priority
permanent placement. See PAUL D. STEINHAUER, THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE:
A SYSTEMATIC GUIDE TO CASE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING FOR CHILDREN IN CARE 22032 (1991).
26. See MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 47-48.
27. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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after hearing extensive testimony on the phenomenon of "foster care
29
drift 2 and the harm that results to children in such placements.
Permanency planning concepts aimed at eliminating or minimizing foster care drift provided the basis for many of the major components of
the CWA. 3 °
Under the CWA, a state is eligible for federal funds for foster care
expenses only if the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
has approved the state's child services plan.3' A state plan must include a provision assuring "that, in each case, reasonable efforts will
be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent
or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B)
to make it possible for the child to return to his home. 32
A state plan must also provide for the development of a "case
plan ' 33 and a "case review system"34 for each child receiving foster
care maintenance payments. 35 The caseworker must develop a case
plan which assures that each child receives proper care and that appropriate services are provided to the original parents, the child, and the
foster parents.36 The case plan should provide services geared toward
improving the conditions in the original family home so the child can
return to that home.37 Alternatively, if return is not possible, the case
plan must arrange for a timely, permanent placement for the child.38
During a case review, a reviewing tribunal must determine the
continuing need for an out-of-home placement, the appropriateness of
the current placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and
the progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the problems which

28. "Foster care drift" occurs when children live in temporary foster care placements
for periods in excess of two years. David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the
Failuresof the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PIrr. L. REV. 139, 158-59 (1992).
29. S. REP. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1448; Garrison, Parental Rights, supra note 23, at 427-42; Herring, supra note 28, at
158-60; Shotton, supra note 13, at 224.
30. See MALUCCIO Er AL., supra note 6, at 21; Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 336;
Pelton, supra note 13, at 337; Rooney, supra note 3, at 152.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
32. Id. § 671(a)(15).
33. See supra note 17 for the definition of case plan.
34. The "case review system" is defined as a procedure for assuring that each child has
a case plan that is periodically reviewed. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (1988).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
36. Id. § 675(1).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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led to the out-of-home placement. 39 Reviewing tribunals must also set
a target date by which the child should be returned to the parental
home, freed for adoption, or placed with a permanent legal guardian.'
Case review systems must also ensure that every child in state foster
care receives a dispositional hearing held by an appropriate state court
or administrative body. 4' Dispositional hearings must occur within
eighteen months of the child's removal from the parental home and
periodically thereafter. 42 The tribunal conducting the hearing must
determine the child's future placement.43 The child's future placement
could include a return to the parental home; a continuation of foster
care for a specified period of time; an adoption; or, as a result of a
child's special needs or particular circumstances, placement in a permanent or long-term foster home. 44
When courts attempted to interpret and implement some of the major
permanency planning components included in the CWA, substantial
ambiguities in the legislation were discovered. For example, neither
the CWA nor subsequently issued HHS regulations define the term
"reasonable efforts. 45 Moreover, the CWA failed to propose guidelines for judicial enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement.46
The CWA also allowed the "permanent" decision required at the
eighteen-month court hearing to include continuation of foster care for
an undefined "specified period" of time. 47 Despite these ambiguities,
the CWA clearly aims for the elimination of foster care drift.
Some state legislatures, following the lead of Congress, incorporated permanency planning concepts into state child welfare laws.
For example, Michigan adopted a statutory scheme that requires: (1)
judicial examination of agency efforts at each stage of a child welfare
proceeding; (2) return of the child to a parent's custody if the parent's
home could be made reasonably safe through the provision of services;
(3) detailed case plans; (4) three-month judicial review hearings; and
39. Id. § 675(5)(B).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 675(5)(C). The CWA specifically allows state courts to appoint or approve
an administrative body to perform the dispositional hearing. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Herring, supra note 28, at 152; John J.Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care:
Federal Statutory Reform and the Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633,
723-25 (1981); James R. Seaberg, "Reasonable Efforts:" Toward Implementation in
Permanency Planning, 65 CHILD WELFARE 469, 470-71 (1986); Shotton, supra note 13,
at 225.
46. Herring, supra note 28, at 152-55; Shotton, supra note 13, at 226-27.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
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(5) a judicial permanency hearing that must be conducted within the
first year of the child's removal from parental custody.48 Moreover,
Michigan law specifically requires a court to make appropriate "permanent" decisions at the permanency hearing."
Despite the advancements of social work practice and legislative
reform based on permanency planning concepts, children still languish
in temporary foster care placements. The foster care population has
grown dramatically, while the average length of stay in temporary
foster care placements exceeds two years in many jurisdictions.50 In a
48. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.1-.20 (West 1993).

49. Id. § 712A.19a(4)-(6). The court has several options at the permanency hearing.
First, if the court determines that returning the child to the parental home would not
cause a substantial risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental wellbeing, the court must order the child returned to the parental home. Id. § 712A.19a(4).
Second, if the court finds that the child would face a substantial risk of harm if placed in
the parental home, the court must order the state child welfare agency to file a petition
seeking termination of parental rights within 42 days. Id. § 712A.19a(5). However, if
the state's child welfare agency demonstrates that termination of parental rights is
clearly not in the best interests of the child, the court can either order that the child be
placed in foster care on a long-term basis or order the continuation of the child's
temporary foster care placement for a limited, expressly stated, period of time. Id.
§ 712A.19a(5)-(6).
50. David J. Herring, Legal Representationfor the State Child Welfare Agency in
Civil Child Protection Proceedings: A Comparative Study, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 603, 606,
619 & n.65, 620, 670-71 (1993). The number of children in foster care has increased
dramatically from 280,000 children at the end of fiscal year 1986 to 407,000 children at
the end of fiscal year 1990. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103d CONG., 2D SESS.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS:
1994 GREEN BOOK 640 tbl. #14-14 (1994)
[hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. This increase has continued, with 442,000 childrcn living in

foster care placements at the end of fiscal year 1992. Id. The phenomenon of foster care
drift caused by the failure of the child welfare system to achieve timely permanent
placements for children living in temporary foster care placements has been well
documented. A New York adoption study revealed that in 1989, a child, on average,
spent 4.6 years in foster care before being eligible for adoption. DEBRA RATTERMAN,
TERMINATION BARRIERS: SPEEDING ADOPTION IN NEW YORK STATE THROUGH REDUCING

DELAYS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES at iii (1991); see also PERMANENCY
PLANNING TASK FORCE COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES SUBCOMMITTEE,
DEMOGRAPHICS OF PERMANENCY IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA (1992) (reporting

that of the children living in foster care in Allegheny County, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, 44% had been in foster care for more than two years); VOLUNTARY
COOPERATIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM & AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION,
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN IN SUBSTITUTE AND ADOPTIVE CARE: A STATISTICAL
SUMMARY OF THE VCIS NATIONAL CHILD WELFARE DATABASE 116-17 (1993) [hereinafter

VCIS CHARACTERISTICS 1993] (summarizing statistics showing that by the end of fiscal
year 1989, 39.5% of the children living in substitute care had been in care for more than
two years, 15.5% had been in care between two and three years, 13.4% had been in care
between three and five years, and 10.6% had been in care five years or more); Katrine
Ames et al., Fostering the Family: An Intensive Effort to Keep Kids with Parents,
NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1992, at 64 (revealing that a child in Alabama spends an average of
35 months in foster care).
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very real sense, the permanency planning reform movement failed to
achieve its goals in the trenches of the child welfare system. As
elaborated upon in the next two sections, this failure can be attributed
to the perception by legal decision-makers of weaknesses in the traditional justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts. 5'
III. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMANENCY

PLANNING

Integrating permanency planning concepts into both social work
practice and child welfare laws has several traditional justifications.
Permanency planning concepts arose out of the fields of social work
and child psychology; therefore, justifications based on human service
and psychological principles dominate.5 2 An examination of the scholarly works in these fields, as well as child welfare law, reveals the following traditional justifications.
A. Child Development Principlesas a Justification
for Permanency Planning
A primary basis for implementing permanency planning concepts
arises from child development principles.53 Child development scholars developed an extensive body of theoretical work concerning the
harm children may suffer while placed in unplanned long-term foster
care.54 Commentators theorize that children left in lengthy "temporary" foster care placements have difficulty forming the committed,
trusting relationships necessary for healthy development into adequately functioning adults.55 Although empirical studies initially
validated these theories, subsequent studies ultimately failed to validate

51. See supra note 9 for a definition of "legal decision-makers."
52. See Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 335-37. See generally MALUCCIO ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 3-30 (discussing the development of permanency planning); Pelton,
supra note 13, at 337-38 (discussing the evolution of permanency planning and the
failure of permanency planning); Rooney, supra note 3, at 152-55 (discussing the goals
and achievements of permanency planning); Rzepnicki, supra note 4, at 56-58
(discussing the problems and changes in the foster care system).
53. See Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 337. See generally MALUCCIO ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 7-8; Pelton, supra note 13, at 337 (discussing permanency planning as
evolving from the belief that children need a permanent home); Rzepnicki, supra note 4,
at 57 (discussing the problems of foster care).
54. See Wald, supra note 23, at 667-69.
55. Id. See Herring, supra note 28, at 146-50 (relating that recent empirical studies
indicate that unplanned long-term foster care placements result in worse developmental
outcomes for children than adoption or other planned permanent placements); Wald,
supra note 23, at 669-72 (discussing short-term and long-term harms).
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56
this justification for permanency planning concepts.
For instance, by the mid- 1970s, studies seemed to indicate that children may suffer significant developmental harm in temporary foster
care placements.57 The strongest evidence of harm arose in cases
where states repeatedly moved children between foster homes.5"
These studies demonstrated that the inability of children to form attachments to others had a negative impact on their healthy development.59
Even this strong evidence was, however, equivocal; subsequent
empirical studies indicated that children did not necessarily suffer
significant developmental harm from temporary foster care placements.6o
Despite this lack of strong empirical support, many commentators
perceive a real risk of developmental harm resulting from unplanned
lengthy foster care placements. 6' The official purpose and the known
realities of the foster care system reinforce this perception. The main
purpose of foster care is to provide only temporary care for a child
who must be removed from parental custody.62 The child welfare
agency's ultimate goal is to reunite the child and the biological parents. 63 In reality, therefore, agencies do not utilize foster care to provide the child with a permanent substitute family. Instead, agencies
use foster care to provide the child with a temporary, family-like living
situation that meets the child's basic' needs.65

56. See STEINHAUER, supra note 25, at 222-23; Garrison, Child Welfare
Decisionmaking, supra note 23, at 1777-86 (citing evidence suggesting that a vast
majority of foster children mature without serious problems despite temporary
placements).
57. See Wald, supra note 23, at 669-72 (discussing short-term and long-term harms).
58. See id. at 671.
59. See id.; Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 23, at 1780-81.
60. MICHAEL S. WALD Er AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 9-20,
100-31, 181-91 (1988); see Garrsion, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 23, at
1777-86.
61. The strength of these perceptions led to profound reforms in child welfare policy
and practice during the 1980s. See Garrision, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note
23, at 1758-62; Shotton, supra note 13, at 224-25.
62. MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
63. See id.
64. Basic needs include essentials such as shelter, clothing, and food. JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 24 (1973).
65. See Garrison, Parental Rights, supra note 23, at 426-42; Michael B. Mushlin,
Unsafe Havens: The Case for ConstitutionalProtection of Foster Childrenfrom Abuse
and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 203-09 (1988); Kevin M. Ryan,
Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: A Due ProcessPerspective, 42 CATH. U. L.
REV. 271, 280-84 (1993); Daniel L. Skoler, A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster
Care?-Time for the Supreme Court to Pay its LO.U., 18 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 356-59
(1991).
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This overall purpose of foster care is evident in mandatory foster
parent training programs: child welfare agencies train foster parents to
facilitate the children's reunion with their biological families.66 This
facilitation role may not involve actual efforts to assist the biological
parents, but it certainly requires foster parents to maintain a certain
psychological distance from the foster child. 67 As a general rule, child
welfare agencies instruct foster parents to avoid forming the desire to
maintain a long-term relationship with the child.68 In child welfare
agency language, the foster parent is a "contract service provider," not
a parent.69
The purpose and realities of foster care placements, viewed in
conjunction with child development theory, 70 result in a perceived need
to limit the time a child spends in temporary foster care placements. 7 '
Based on child development information, the general belief is that a
child must be placed in a family that has made a permanent commitment to the child in time to meet the child's developmental needs.72
Hence, child development principles provide a powerful justification
for implementing permanency planning concepts despite the lack of
empirical evidence. This justification is strengthened by legal scholars' reliance on child development principles in their comments on
child welfare practices and law reform.73
B. Social Work PracticeConcepts as a Justification
for PermanencyPlanning
Another customary justification for permanency planning is that
implementing positive changes in social work practice would result
from permanency planning concepts: caseworkers would be required
66. Skoler, supra note 65, at 357.
67. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 23-24.
68. Id. at 24.
69. See id. at 23-26.
70. For an explanation of child development theory, see supra notes 53-69 and
accompanying text.
71.

See generally JOHN BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss (1969) (establishing a

theory of human and child psychology); VERA I. FAHLBERG, A CHILD'S JOURNEY
THROUGH PLACEMENT 67-140 (1991) (discussing the need for stable relationships
throughout a child's development); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 31-49
(discussing child development in the context of the impact of a proposed child
placement system).
72. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 13-15 (discussing parental needs of
children).
73. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 599, 622-26 (1973); Wald, supra note 23, at 644-46; Musewicz, supra note
45, at 647-74.
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to address a child's need for a permanent home from the very
beginning of a case.74 Permanency planning concepts require governmental action prior to an actual incident of child maltreatment. Preferably, this action would occur at the first indication of a substantial
risk of significant parenting problems, or when a parent requests
assistance.7 5 A major component of implementing permanency
planning concepts is creating services designed to prevent child maltreatment.76
Once an incident of child maltreatment occurs, the assigned caseworker must assess the biological family thoroughly.77 Based on this
assessment, the caseworker aggressively attempts to fashion specific,
targeted services designed to avoid the need to remove the child from
the parental home or to allow for swift reunion of the family if removal
is mandated. 8

Based on the presumption that the biological family is the primary
and most appropriate permanent placement for the child, permanency
planning concepts necessitate services designed for family preservation.79 Thus, under permanency planning concepts, the caseworker
first must work intensely to formulate a case-specific service plan.8'
The caseworker next must determine whether the identified parenting problems, when addressed by appropriate and available
services, nevertheless pose a substantial risk of harm to the child.8" If
this risk exists, the child must be removed from the parental home.8
The caseworker must then continually assess the success or failure
of the services being provided. 3 If the services successfully lower the
child's risk of harm to an acceptable level, the caseworker must ensure
74. See Katz, supra note 18, at 221.
75. Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 338-39.
76. Id.; see MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 32-34; Katz, supra note 18, at 220-21.
77. For the purposes of this Article, assume that incidents of child maltreatment occur
when the child is living with one or both biological parents. Although this is certainly
not always the case in child welfare matters, this assumption is used for two reasons.
First, it is the most typical situation confronted in child welfare practice. Second, it
simplifies the discussion of permanency planning concepts by avoiding the situation in
which a child has a "psychological parent" who is not a biological parent. Thus, when
the term "biological family" is used, assume that the biological parent or parents within
this family are also the child's psychological parent or parents. See generally
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 9-27 (discussing several different types of parentchild relationships).
78. ERWIN H. PLUMER, WHEN YOU PLACE A CHILD 73-77 (1992).
79. See Katz, supra note 18, at 221.
80. See id. at 221, 224-26.
8 1. MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 20-30.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the child's swift return to the parental home. 4 If the services are
unsuccessful, the caseworker must aggressively move toward another
permanent placement for the child in time to meet the child's
developmental needs. Therefore, following permanency planning
guidelines, the public child welfare agency must develop a broad range
of quality programs. These programs should provide intense support
and reunion services to troubled families in a timely manner.8 6
Many textbooks in the social work field now emphasize permanency
planning because these social work practice principles are comprehensive and beneficial.87 Permanency planning concepts provide a
framework for a very proactive, positive child welfare agency and
caseworker role. The desire to realize this positive role provides a
strong rationale for adopting and implementing permanency planning
concepts.
C. FinancialImplicationsas a Justification
for Permanency Planning
A third justification for permanency planning arises from the
financial implications of implementing permanency planning concepts.
Commentators point to the potential cost savings that could result from
comprehensive implementation of permanency planning. 8 These cost
savings are a product of the predicted reduction in foster care expenses.89 Placing a child in foster care costs between $10,000 and
$20,000 a year, including assignable administrative costs. 9° Applying
permanency planning concepts will significantly reduce the cost of
foster care because implementation will arguably result in a reduction
of the total number of days children will spend in foster care. 9'
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 207-23; Herring, supra note 50, at 624-34.
87.

RICHARD P. BARTH ET AL., FROM CHILD ABUSE TO PERMANENCY PLANNING 3-21

(1994); MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 21; PETER J. PECORA ET AL., THE CHILD
WELFARE CHALLENGE 43-46 (1992); LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 79-110
(1989); TOGETHER AGAIN: FAMILY REUNIFICATION IN FOSTER CARE 3-33 (Barbara A. Pine
et al. eds., 1993); THEODORE J. STEIN, SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE IN CHILD WELFARE 99-115

(1981).
88. See Rooney, supra note 3, at 155-56.
89. Id. at 156.
90. See Herring, supra note 50, at 618 n.61.
91. See RATTERMAN, supra note 50, at 27-29; Herring, supra note 50, at 662-71. The
total number of days in foster care will be reduced by preventing some initial foster care
placements, and through swift reunification of biological families. Herring, supra note
50, at 662.
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Researchers have performed numerous cost/benefit studies on the
92
effects of implementing various permanency planning components.
These studies address a broad range of reforms9 3 based on permanency planning concepts.94 Family preservation programs have
received the most attention. 95 Early studies indicate that despite increased costs incurred in hiring more caseworkers to implement family
preservation programs, the offsetting foster care savings make these
programs extremely cost-effective.96 The potential savings provide a
powerful justification for implementing permanency planning
concepts. Policy and budgetary decision-makers, such as child welfare agency administrators and legislators, are especially persuaded by
this financial justification. 97
D. Preservationof Minority Familiesas a Justification
for PermanencyPlanning
A fourth justification arises from the racial makeup of children and
families involved in the public child welfare system. Families of color
are disproportionately represented in the child welfare system.98
Nationwide, African-American children comprise 14.6% of the child
population; 99 however, 36.5% of the children placed in foster care are
92. BARTHEL, supra note 21, at 15, 45; Herring, supra note 50, at 662-71.
93. Reforms range from intensive family preservation programs to models of legal
representation for child welfare agencies. See BARTHEL, supra note 21, at 15, 45;
RAYERMAN, supra note 50, at 5-25 (noting that, among other reforms, the child welfare
agency hired a full-time "permanency planning specialist").
94. BARTHEL, supra note 21, at 15, 45; RATTERMAN, supra note 50, at iii-v; Herring,
supra note 50, at 662-71.
95. See BARTHEL, supra note 21, at 45.
96. Id. at 15, 45-48. But see Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 339. "Recent studies
in California, New Jersey, and elsewhere show mixed results regarding the effectiveness
of family preservation services in preventing out-of-home placement." Id. at 339
(footnote omitted).
97. In fact, a number of commentators have argued that this powerful financial
justification has led to an inappropriate, across-the-board adoption of family
preservation and other preventive services. E.g., Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at
339. As Fein and Maluccio state:
Family preservation and family resource services for families whose children
are at imminent threat of removal have been popular prescriptions for the
crisis in numbers faced by the state agencies. Their justification has been
their cost-effectiveness in reducing days in foster care. But without adequate
funding, these solutions remain short-term, crisis-oriented, and stopgap and
lack ongoing support for families. We shall have to learn again, as if another
lesson were needed, that under-funded services provide only short-term gain.
Id.
98. Id. at 338.
99. THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVIL LiBERTIES UNION, A FORCE FOR
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African-American. '0 This fact has led critics to charge the child welfare system with racial and cultural genocide at worst and cultural bias
and ignorance at best.'0 '
A child welfare system based on permanency planning concepts
addresses these concerns quite well because implementing these concepts often allows the child to remain in the biological family. 0 2 For
example, the creation of a significant legal hurdle before removing a
child from parental custody obviously helps families of color remain
intact. Similarly, intensive and comprehensive family support services
also help preserve these families. In addition, permanency planning
concepts can be used to support the idea of kinship placement0 3 if
removal from the parental home becomes necessary.' °4 Through the
use of kinship care, the extended family remains intact and provides an
environment of stability and permanency for the child and the child's
culture.
Concern for the preservation of minority families, however, fails to
support other permanency planning concepts. For example, permanency planning concepts mandate a timely adoption placement in order
to meet the child's developmental needs, when return to the biological
parent is not possible. 10 5 As a result, more children of color will
become available for adoption. Due to the shortage of adoptive homes

11 (1993) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT].
100. Id.; see also VCIS CHARACTERISTICS 1993, supra note 50, at 91-94. White
children comprise 69.3% of all children in the United States and represent 45.5% of the
children in foster care, while Latino/a children comprise 11.7% of all children in the
United States and represent 10.1% of the children in foster care. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
PROJECT, supra note 99, at 11.
101. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING 86-117 (1993); Sylvia S. Gray & Lynn M. Nybell, Issues in AfricanAmerican Family Preservation,69 CHILD WELFARE 513, 522 (1990); Patricia T. Hogan &
Sau-Fong Siu, Minority Children and the Child Welfare System: An Historical
Perspective, 33 SOC. WORK 493, 494 (1988); Randall Kennedy, Orphans of Separatism:
The Painful Politics of TransracialAdoption, 17 AM. PROSPECT 38, 38 (1994); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438-42 (1991); Carol B. Stack,
Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 539, 545-47
(1983-84).
102. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
103. "Kinship placement" requires caseworkers to first seek out-of-home placement
with members of the biological family. Gray & Nybell, supra note 101, at 515-17.
Permanency planning favors return to the nuclear family, but considers the extended
family as the next best permanent placement. Id. at 517.
104. Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 340; Stack, supra note 101, at 539-40, 54647.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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in the minority community," °6 many minority children will be adopted
by white parents.' °7 The National Association of Black Social
Workers vehemently and vigorously opposes these transracial adoptions and, if agencies fully implement this component of permanency
planning concepts, the allegations of cultural genocide may become
stronger.'0 8
Therefore, the preservation of families of color provides strong
support for implementing many, but not all, components of permanency planning concepts. The components which lead to timely family
preservation or reunification and those which incorporate an extended
definition of the family assist in the preservation of families of color.
In contrast, the components which require timely permanent placements outside the extended biological family will lead to the opposite
result.
Child development principles, social work practice concepts,
financial implications, and the preservation of families of color provide
the traditional justifications for implementing permanency planning.
These justifications, compelling and persuasive for policy-level
decision-makers as well as decision-makers involved in law reform
efforts, have resulted in broad administrative and legislative
reforms. 1°9 The next part of this Article addresses the impact, or lack
thereof, of these traditional justifications on legal decision-makers in
their representative and judicial capacities.
IV. LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS AND TRADITIONAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMANENCY PLANNING:

FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT

While permanency planning concepts seem to have prevailed in the
effort to reform official policies and formal procedures within the child
welfare system, the actual results of such reforms have been less than
impressive. Several commentators have documented many aspects of
this failure to implement permanency planning concepts effectively in
day-to-day child welfare practice.'" This Part section discusses
specific permanency planning ideas which have not been fully
106. BARTHOLET, supra note 101, at 95-96; Hogan & Siu, supra note 101, at 494; see
Kennedy, supra note 101, at 39.
107. Hogan & Siu, supra note 101, at 496.
108. Id.
109. See supra part 11.
110. Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 337-39; Herring, supra note 28, at 179-94;
Herring, supra note 50, at 603-12; Pelton, supra note 13, at 338; Shotton, supra note
13, at 225-33.
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implemented in day-to-day child welfare practice. Additionally, this
Part offers reasons why legal decision-makers and caseworkers have
not implemented these concepts will be provided.
A. Permanency PlanningImplementation: A
Chronicle of Failure
Despite the traditional justifications for vigorously implementing
permanency planning concepts, public child welfare agencies and legal
decision-makers do not in fact apply these concepts in their daily
work. Commentators have noted three areas in which permanency
planning concepts are clearly not being implemented: (1) the statutory
"reasonable efforts" requirement;"' (2) the formulation and monitoring
of case-specific service
plans;1 12 and (3) permanent family placement
13
manner.'
timely
in a
First and foremost, the enforcement of the reasonable efforts
requirement in the CWA has been a significant failure. Some explain
this failure by pointing to the lack of community services available or
utilized in attempting to meet the CWA's reasonable efforts requirement.1 4 The primary responsibility for failure to enforce reasonable
efforts, however, rests on state juvenile court judges." 5 One survey
of 1200 state judges revealed that only 44 ever found that the public
child welfare agency failed to make reasonable efforts. 1 6 In fact,
many jurisdictions utilize preprinted court order forms which either
include a statement that the public child welfare agency has made
reasonable efforts, or merely require court personnel to check a box
placed next to such a preprinted statement.1 '

111. See generally Seaberg, supra note 45 (discussing the reasonable efforts
requirement under the CWA).
1 12. Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 338-39.
113. Id. at 338.
114. Id. at 338-39.
115. Shotton, supra note 13, at 225-27.
116. Id. at 237.
117. Herring, supra note 28, at 153-54; Shotton, supra note 13, at 227. As a clinical
law teacher who represents children and parents in dependency proceedings in the
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania Juvenile Court, the author witnesses the use of this
type of preprinted court order daily. The United States Supreme Court has recently
interpreted the CWA in a way that sanctions this lack of enforcement of the reasonable
efforts requirement. Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992). In Artist M., the Court
held that there is no private cause of action based on the CWA's reasonable efforts
requirement, and indicated that the only requirement of the CWA is that the state have an
approved state plan in effect and on file with the Federal Department of Health and
Human Services. Id. at 1369-70.
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Another area of process deficiency involves the failure of caseworkers to formulate and monitor case service plans. Although
caseworkers are supposed to formulate case service plans in a timely
manner, caseworkers often ignore the deadlines imposed." 18 Once
caseworkers formulate case plans, they regularly fail to identify
specific parenting problems." 9 Frequently, the case service plan
merely provides a laundry list of services not aimed at the specific
parenting problems that gave rise to the particular case.' 20 The list of
services often automatically includes parenting classes, a substance
abuse evaluation, mental health counseling, housing assistance, education or job training, and visitation between child and parent.' 2' In
implementing such a generalized case plan, the agency caseworker
22
often fails to focus on the specific parenting problems present.'
Needed services are usually not provided intensively, or even
118. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 50, at 648 (discussing an empirical study in
Jackson County, Michigan which revealed that, in 1989, despite state child welfare law
mandating the development of an initial case service plan within 30 days of removal,
case service plans were developed, on average, 92.2 days after removal).
119. In representing parents in civil child protection proceedings in Michigan and
Pennsylvania for over seven years, the author has often been startled by caseworkers'
lack of knowledge concerning their parent-clients' parenting problems and the causes of
these problems. The most common scenario involves a child who has been physically
or sexually abused by a client's spouse or partner. In this type of situation, the
caseworker will often assume that if the partner leaves the home, the problems will be
solved. The case plan will usually consist of two requirements: (1) the partner must
move out of the home; and (2) the parent must participate in a generic group of parenting
skills programs. The caseworker will neither investigate the client's mental health
history, nor consider requesting that the client undergo a psychological evaluation and
individual counseling. As the parent's attorney, the author often has to counsel his
client to seek these services in order to identify and treat the underlying problems in the
parenting situation.
120. In representing state child welfare agencies, parents, and children in civil child
protection proceedings in Michigan and Pennsylvania for over seven years, the author
has regularly confronted these types of case service plans. Caseworkers overwhelmed
with caseloads between 30 and 50 families regularly rely on general case plans that are
not tailored to the problems of the specific parent, child, or family. Based on the
author's discussions with child welfare attorneys across the country, this problem
appears typical.
121. See supra note 120.
122. In the author's experience, generalized case plans often fail to provide the one
or two services that would be crucial in allowing the parent to provide a safe home for a
child. The author is often involved with parents whose primary problem is a lack of
adequate housing. In these cases, the caseworker will often require the parent to contact
a broad array of service providers, but will fail to provide any effective assistance in
finding adequate housing. In addition, in cases where the parent's primary problem is
substance abuse, the caseworker will often fail to assist the parent in enrolling in a
substance abuse program in a timely manner. While waiting to enter a program (often
for periods exceeding six months), the parent will have to participate in many services
that cannot be effective prior to substance abuse treatment.
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diligently.123
Such poorly formulated and implemented case service plans render
it impossible for courts to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the plan. 24 Courts lose focus on the true problems while
monitoring a parent's participation in the standard laundry list of
services.125 As a result, courts often give up on monitoring casespecific problems as they review a large number of cases 2 6 which all
appear similar in terms of case service plans.' 27 If a court stays
involved with a case, it will often penalize parents by requiring the
completion
of unnecessary services prior to reunification with the
128
child.

Indeed, the failure of child welfare systems to achieve outcomes that
are consistent with permanency planning concepts is startling. Over
the past decade, the number of children in substitute care has risen
from 262,000 children to 442,000 children. 129 Some attribute this rise
123. See supra note 122. Generalized case plans that require the caseworker to
provide a broad array of services to every client exacerbate the problem of overworked
and overloaded caseworkers. Instead of efficiently and intensely providing only those
services that are necessary to address the specific parenting problems in the case, the
caseworker, on paper, is required to expend substantial effort in providing numerous,
unnecessary services.
124. Based on the author's experiences as a child welfare attorney in juvenile courts
in urban areas, judges must manage dockets that require the review of up to 60 cases each
day. In such circumstances, judges can spend approximately 10 to 20 minutes reviewing
each case. These short hearings make it extremely difficult for judges to review welldrafted, efficient case plans in a comprehensive or rigorous manner. When case plans
include a general laundry list of services that are not tailored to the specific parenting
problems present in the case, comprehensive and rigorous review becomes an
impossibility.
125. See supra note 124.
i 26. The author has witnessed this judicial response directly in his child welfare law
practice in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The juvenile court judges regularly fail to include
express provisions in their court orders concerning parent/child visitation and services
for a parent. A typical court order will include one sentence that applies to the specific
case before the court. The sentence will address only the issue of the child's placement
(e.g., "child to remain in foster care with renew in six months"). In some cases the
judges include express provisions for services for children (e.g., individual
psychological counseling, or a medical evaluation), but the judges rarely address
additional issues in their court orders. In this author's opinion, the judges' lack of
initiative to require case-specific plans is fueled by their perception that caseworkers are
only capable of developing general, uniform lists of services required in every case.
127. See supra note 126.
128. This has been a common problem confronted by the clients the author
represents in civil child protection matters. Judges who have not been able to review
specific cases comprehensively and rigorously are naturally reluctant to return a child to
a parent. This reluctance results in higher hurdles to reunification being raised as a case
continues in the court system.
129. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 50, at 640 tbl. #14-14.
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to the rise in crack cocaine use by young women. 30 Thus, the
increase in foster care placements could be seen as less a failure to
implement permanency planning concepts and more a result of social
phenomena that exist independent of the public child welfare
system.'31
To some extent, however, the failure to create widely available
comprehensive drug treatment programs designed to meet the special
needs of young women and their children is part of the failure to
implement permanency planning. concepts.132 Likewise, the failure of
agencies and courts to investigate and assess drug-using parents to
determine whether they can provide adequate care for their children
constitutes a failure to understand and implement permanency planning
concepts. 33 Instead, agencies and courts often use a knee-jerk
approach to drug-using parents 13which
results in automatic removal of
4
children from parental custody.
Despite attempts to attribute the rise in foster care placements to drug
abuse, the available statistics concerning the average length of time
children spend in temporary foster care placements reveal the failure to
implement permanency planning concepts effectively. Nationwide,
approximately forty percent of the children placed in substitute care
spend over two years in continuous placement outside the parental
home, with the average length of time being much longer in many

130. See Richard P. Barth, Revisiting the Issues: Adoption of Drug-Exposed
Children, 3 FUTURE CHILDREN 167, 168 (1993); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF
AMERICA'S CHILDREN YEARBOOK 1994 6, 19 (1994) [hereinafter STATE OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN]; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 289 (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIC].

131. See supra note 130.
132. See generally BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 130, at 289-96 (noting a lack of
services designed to prevent removal; urging a renewed commitment to permanency
planning; and recommending the development of community-based drug and alcohol
treatment programs for parents, pregnant women, and children); Fein & Maluccio, supra
note 13, at 338-39 (noting that permanency planning efforts should begin before a child
is removed, and then noting the slow growth and lack of effectiveness of services
designed to prevent removal).
133. See, e.g., Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn:
A Return to PrincipledIntervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 745-58 (1990).
134. See id. Automatic removal of children based on parental drug abuse does not
occur in many urban jurisdictions. This is mainly due to the flood of those cases rather
than improved investigation and assessment procedures. Based on the author's
experiences in juvenile courts in Detroit, Michigan, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
agency administrators and juvenile court judges realize that they cannot remove every
child whose parent uses drugs. But rather than investigate and assess these cases for the
possible provision of preventive services, the system takes no action. This approach
contradicts permanency planning concepts.
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jurisdictions.'35 These statistics indicate the failure of actors within the
child welfare system to make adequate efforts to rehabilitate parents in
a timely manner. 36 Although the statistics only indicate the failure to
make adequate efforts, it is clear that caseworkers fail to achieve timely
permanent placements for37children whose parents cannot be rehabilitated in a timely manner.1
Despite system reforms based on permanency planning concepts, a
significant number of children are languishing in temporary foster care
placements. Public child welfare agencies fail to recommend, and state
juvenile courts fail to order, adoption placements, legal guardianship
placements, or even formally recognized long-term foster care placements in a timely manner. Despite the traditional justifications for the
energetic implementation of permanency planning concepts, the procedures actually utilized and the results actually achieved in child
welfare cases vividly illustrate the failure to implement permanency
planning concepts in any serious way in the trenches of the child
welfare system.
B. Legal Decision-Makers' FailureTo Implement
Permanency Planning
1. Background
Child welfare practitioners and scholars have provided several
reasons for the failure to implement permanency planning concepts.
First, those working in the system attribute the failure to utilize family
support and child welfare services to the lack of money allocated for
38
these services and the lack of coordination of the services available.
Second, although policymakers may grasp permanency planning
concepts, agency caseworkers are not fully trained and do not fully
135. See STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 130, at 23 (relating that the
median length of time infants (children who entered foster care before one year of age)
spent in continuous foster care placement was 43.4 months in New York, 33.2 months
in Illinois, 25.3 months in California); see supra note 50.
136. See Fein & Maluccio, supra note 13, at 338-39; Richard Perez-Pena, Children
Held Longer in Limbo of Foster Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at A16; see supra note
135.
137. Of course, these statistics merely indicate the failure of agency and judicial
personnel to make adequate efforts, because even intensive efforts may fail as a result of
parental unwillingness or inability to respond to rehabilitative efforts.
138. See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 130, at 281-309; MARK HARDIN,
ESTABLISHING A CORE OF SERVICES FOR FAMILIES SUBJECT TO STATE INTERVENTION at iii-xi,
1 (1992); STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 130, at 45-51; CHILDREN CAN'T

WAIT 1-12 (Katherine Cahn & Paul Johnson eds., 1993); Fein & Maluccio, supra note
13, at 344.
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understand permanency planning concepts. 39 Without a comprehensive understanding of permanency planning concepts, caseworkers
are unable to implement these concepts in their daily practices and
decisions. Third, caseworkers claim that biological parents' rights are
overemphasized. 4 ° Practitioners perceive parental rights as a subbarrier to achieving timely permanent
stantial, if not insurmountable,
4
placements for children.1 '
All of these reasons interrelate. Inadequate resource allocation often
results in inadequate training. Inadequate training can lead to confusion and misconceptions about the scope and effect of a biological
parent's legal rights to a child. Misconceptions about parental rights
can lead to a sense of hopelessness that works to frustrate the full
implementation of permanency planning concepts.
Although agency caseworkers may use the above reasons to explain
their failure to implement permanency planning concepts actively, legal
decision-makers, both attorneys and judges, cannot persuasively
utilize these reasons to explain their own failure to implement permanency planning concepts. Although legal decision-makers face
inadequate funding just as agency caseworkers do, the consequence of
inadequate resources on the legal decision-maker is simply an42
explosion in the number of cases handled by each decision-maker.
The explosion of caseloads should not preclude the aggressive implementation of permanency planning concepts within the court system.

139. See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 130, at 287-89; SUSAN GOODMAN & JOAN
HURLEY, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REASONABLE EFFORTS: WHO DECIDES
WHAT'S REASONABLE? 5 (1993); Katherine Cahn & Paul Johnson, Improving Child
Welfare Practice Through Improvements in Attorney-Social Worker Relationships, 54
U. PITr. L. REV. 229, 232 (1992).
140. See generally Musewicz, supra note 45, at 653-61 (arguing that parental rights
are often favored by courts even when they conflict with the child's best interests). The
author is often confronted by caseworkers who are frustrated, and sometimes outraged, at
the legal system due to its perceived overprotection of parental rights. Although they
generally realize that the courts will sanction their interventions in families,
caseworkers often do not understand the courts' insistence on the reunification of
children and birth parents, or the substantial hurdles they confront when seeking
termination of parental rights. These caseworker perceptions are not surprising since
caseworkers receive very little legal consultation or advocacy training. See Herring,
supra note 50, at 603-30.
141. See supra note 140.
142. For example, the author has learned that in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
Juvenile Court judges handle up to 60 dependency cases each day. Attorneys
representing children handle approximately 800 child clients, and each parent's
attorney represents approximately 500 parent clients. From the author's discussions
with other legal professionals across the nation, this situation is typical in most urban
jurisdictions.
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There are several isolated, but compelling, examples of judges and
attorneys who have successfully implemented permanency planning
concepts without a significant increase in resources. 4 3 These isolated
examples demonstrate the power of legal decision-makers to promote
positive change single-handedly within the child welfare system.
Moreover, these isolated examples indicate that rather than the need for
more resources, the desirability of implementing permanency planning
concepts needs to be acknowledged by legal decision-makers.
Furthermore, legal decision-makers, like agency caseworkers, may
attempt to attribute their failure to inadequate training on permanency
planning concepts.' 4 4 But unlike child welfare agency caseworkers
who may not have received training in the field of social work, 145 all
lawyers and judges have received training in the law. By the very
nature of the legal profession, lawyers and judges have a duty to
familiarize themselves with applicable child welfare law when involved
in this type of case. 146 Even a cursory awareness of the pertinent
federal and state laws leads to an awareness of permanency planning
concepts and some of the traditional justifications for implementing the
concepts.
143. Several isolated examples of judicial activism in the pursuit of achieving timely
permanent placements for children demonstrate the ability of legal decision-makers to
overcome current obstacles and effectively implement permanency planning concepts.
See, e.g., GOODMAN & HURLEY, supra note 139, at 15 (describing efforts of Judge
Richard Fitzgerald of Jefferson County, Kentucky to use the "reasonable efforts"
requirement to ensure that appropriate permanency planning is accomplished for each
child/family); HARDIN, supra note 21 (describing, in detail, a local court system designed
to achieve timely permanent placements for children); Herring, supra note 50, at 658-59
(describing an activist judge who aggressively urges and compels all the parties and
their attorneys to achieve timely permanent placements). In addition, attorneys
actively representing the child welfare agency can assist in achieving timely permanent
placement outcomes. See id. at 659-60. It should be noted that the implementation of
permanency planning concepts will provide relief to overburdened court systems by
efficiently moving cases through the court system in a timely manner. Id. In addition,
with judicial guidance, implementing permanency planning concepts can result in the
creative use of alternative dispute resolution techniques such as mediation, which can
lead to a reduction in judicial caseloads. See GARY CRIPPEN, MAKING THE SYSTEM WORK:
COURTS AS AGENTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN FAMILY AND JUVENILE CASES 20-21 (1993);
Jessica Pearson et al., Mediation of Child Welfare Cases, 20 FAM. L.Q. 303, 317-20
(1986).
144. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 50, at 603-30.
145. For example, based on the author's experience in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, many child welfare agency caseworkers have two-year associate's degrees
in fields completely unrelated to social work or child psychology.
146. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2) (1990) ("A judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it."); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983) ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
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Consistent with this point, because all competent legal decisionmakers should have knowledge of permanency planning concepts,
they should not point to fear and confusion concerning the legal rights
of biological parents as a reason for not implementing permanency
planning.'47 As competent legal professionals, they must be aware of
achievable
legal options for overcoming parental rights in a timely
48
manner.1
If these common reasons for explaining the failure to implement
permanency planning concepts do not adequately explain the failure of
legal decision-makers to actively implement permanency planning concepts, what explains this failure? The explanation may lie in the perceived weaknesses of the traditional justifications for implementing
permanency planning concepts.
2. Perceived Weaknesses of Traditional Justifications
Child development principles, the basis for the first traditional
justification,'49 are compelling, but have not led to system-wide implementation of permanency planning concepts. Some attorneys and
judges involved in child welfare matters have learned a great deal about
the developmental benefits of timely permanency planning through the
use of child welfare literature and expert testimony during their
cases.' 50 This educational process has led to the implementation of
permanency planning concepts in some cases.' 5 ' Such instances are
isolated, however, and have not led to system-wide implementation of
permanency planning concepts.
One major reason for the failure of child development principles to
persuade legal decision-makers to implement permanency planning
147. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
148. Id. Legal decision-makers should be aware of options such as termination of
parental rights with adoption, legal guardianship, or long-term foster care.
149. See supra part III.A.
150. Based on the author's recent experiences in child dependency cases, legal
decision-makers' exposure to child welfare literature and expert testimony has taught
them the importance of permanency planning the healthy development of children. See
HARDIN, supra note 21, at 1-17, 95-99; Patricia J. White, Courting Disaster: Permanency
Planningfor Children, JUV. JUST., Spring/Summer 1994, at 15.
151. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 50, at 632. In a termination of parental rights
hearing, expert witnesses testified that under the best scenario, the parents would not be
able to provide a home for their I1-month-old child within the next two years (the child
had originally been removed from the parents' care at age five months due to severe
physical abuse). In re McGath, No. 88078885-NA (Genesee County, Mich. P. Ct., May
16, 1989), aff'd in unpublished opinion, No. 118088 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). The
court, in ordering termination of parental rights, found that this two-year period was
well in excess of the reasonable period of time the child could safely wait for a
permanent home in light of her developmental needs. Id.
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concepts may lie in the failure to recognize all the legal rights at issue.
Courts, while clearly recognizing the fundamental nature of a biological parent's right to have custody of his or her child, have to date
failed to recognize
a child's fundamental right to a permanent, stable
15 2
living situation.

A more pragmatic reason for the failure of this justification probably
arises from legal decision-makers' perception of the risks and benefits
involved in implementing permanency planning concepts. If vigorously implemented, permanency planning concepts require legal
decision-makers to make hard decisions relatively early in a child
welfare case, and thus often with incomplete information.153 They
take the risk of returning a child to a parent's custody, with the everpresent possibility that the child will be seVerely harmed and that their
decisions will be scrutinized by the public. 54 Alternatively, legal
decision-makers must often make the emotionally difficult decision to
55
sever a parent's relationship to a child in some permanent manner.
To avoid these risks and difficult decisions, legal decision-makers
could choose to implement permanency planning concepts only in
cases where expert witnesses guide their decisions. 15 6 In these special

152. See generally Musewicz, supra note 45, at 653-61 (describing parental
prerogatives, the child's recognized legal rights, and the child's rights in relation to
parental roles); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Wolfe v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.M. 1982); Child v. Beame, 412
F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C.
1991), affid in part sub nom. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
153. See Herring, supra note 28, at 155-58 (discussing the tendency of judges to find
that the agency has made reasonable efforts based on incomplete or inadequate evidence,
in order to allow removal).
154. Id. For an example of the publicity that can surround a judge who takes this type
of risk (even in a case where the judge was forced to take this risk by an appellate court
order), see Michael A. Fuoco, Dad Held in Death of Girl, 2, PlTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,

Mar. 10, 1994, at A13.
155. See Herring, supra note 28, at 155-58 (discussing the high standard of proving
reasonable efforts that judges impose at a termination of parental rights hearing).
156. Based on the author's experiences, this is a very real possibility. In Allegheny
County, juvenile court judges have adopted the practice of requiring the child welfare
agency to produce expert testimony at all hearings in which the agency is seeking an
involuntary termination of parental rights. The judges rely extensively on the expert's
testimony when issuing an order terminating parental rights.
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cases, 157 any blame for a bad decision can be transferred to expert
witnesses.
Additionally, legal decision-makers often think nothing has to be
done, based on their belief that children are relatively "safe" in foster
care placements, thus negating any need to move swiftly to resolve the
case. 158 Legal decision-makers, who are often not trained in child
psychology, may have difficulty independently realizing the full extent
of developmental harm that temporary foster care placements can
pose.'59 Because legal decision-makers are generally not trained in the
disciplines on which the child development justification is based, it
becomes easy for these decision-makers to sanction the continuation of
a "temporary" foster care placement indefinitely-a placement which is
perceived as "safe" for both the child and the legal decision-makers
involved in the specific case."
Legal decision-makers have difficulty valuing the basis of the secThe dissonance
ond traditional justification-social work practice.
between the fields of social work and law has been welldocumented. 162 Thus, the achievement of social work practice
improvements do not provide legal decision-makers with a compelling
reason to implement permanency planning concepts.
The third justification, financial implications of permanency
planning,163 also fails to influence legal decision-makers. Legal
decision-makers in the child welfare system do not preside over a
public budget that provides funding for foster care placements. Until
the crush of cases builds up to a point where additional attorney and
judicial resources are necessary,164 the financial benefits of imple157. Based on the author's experiences and discussions with child welfare attorneys
nationwide, it is clear that due to funding realities, cases in which expert guidance on
timely permanent decisions is available are special cases within the child welfare
system. The vast majority of parents involved in the child welfare system are indigent
and do not have the resources to retain expert witnesses. Funding levels for juvenile
courts, child welfare agencies, and child advocates do not usually allow for the retention
of experts prior to the time termination of parental rights is seriously considered. Thus,
the use of experts during the first 12 to 18 months of a child welfare proceeding is
relatively rare.
158. For a discussion of juvenile court judges' perceptions of risks in child welfare
matters, see Herring, supra note 28, at 155-58.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See supra part III.B.
162. See Herring, supra note 50, at 610-11.
163. See supra part III.C.
164. Legal decision-makers have an amazing capacity to manage and process a huge
caseload efficiently. The author has witnessed this ability throughout his years in
practice, with juvenile court judges and child welfare attorneys regularly conducting
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menting permanency planning concepts are hidden. Therefore, the
financial implication justification does not provide legal decisionmakers with a strong reason to165implement permanency planning
concepts in their individual cases.
The fourth justification, the preservation of families of color,' 66 also
may not provide legal decision-makers with a convincing reason for
implementing permanency planning concepts. In particular, legal
decision-makers may find it difficult or ineffective to argue that a
system-wide failure is a basis for an individual case. For instance,
even in class action suits brought on behalf of children in foster care,
courts apply traditional legal doctrines and reject the children's claims
of denial of equal protection. 67 Nevertheless, the imbalanced racial
makeup of families in the child welfare system does suggest some
insights for exploring additional
justifications for implementing perma68
nency planning concepts.
The next section will explore additional justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts which are rooted in the basic
principles of the American political system. Legal decision-makers
may find these additional justifications more compelling than the
traditional justifications. These new justifications, in combination with
the traditional justifications, may finally compel legal decision-makers
to take permanency planning concepts seriously in their daily to
practices and decisions.
V. POLITICAL ROLES OF THE FAMILY: ADDITIONAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
PERMANENCY PLANNING CONCEPTS

Political roles for the family in American society provide the basis
for additional justifications for the implementation of permanency
planning concepts. An exploration of political roles seems appropriate
in the public child welfare arena where the public intrudes into family
hearings for 30 cases between the times of 9:30 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. In the author's
experience, this capacity to handle huge caseloads creates a perception that adequate
judicial and attorney resources exist within the child welfare system, and that the need
for reform, such as the vigorous implementation of permanency planning concepts, is
minimal.
165. See supra note 164.
166. See supra part III.D.
167. See Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992); B.H. v. Johnson,
715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). But see Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions and Sec., 400 F. Supp. 249
(M.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976).
168. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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life directly and extensively. In addition, focusing on the political role
of the family seems especially appropriate in light of recent critiques of
the traditional role of the family in society. 169 One commentator
advances a "public family" theory, arguing that the "private" family
has traditionally served a public or political role. 70 Thus, this section
will, explore the political roles for the family within the American
political system and the implications of state intervention in the family
sphere.
In light of the convincing critiques of viewing the family as only
serving a private role, this section will focus its search for additional
justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts on the
private family's role in securing the proper functioning of democratic
processes. This focus is wise in light of the view-adopted by this
Article-that the American political system, as provided for in the
Constitution, is structured primarily to secure the viability and continuation of democratic processes, rather than to define and secure
substantive rights.' 7' Under this view, in order for the justifications
explored to provide compelling reasons for implementing permanency
planning concepts based on the American political system, the justif169. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TuL. L.
REV. 955, 994-1027 (1993); June A. Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of
Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 361, 372-81 (1979); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to their "Rights," 1976
B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 644-56 (1976) [hereinafter Hafen, Children's Liberation];Bruce C.
Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy-Balancing
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 545-68 (1983) [hereinafter
Hafen, Constitutional Status].
170. Dailey, supra note 169, at 994-1008. Professor Dailey asserts that:
The alternative theory of the family developed in [Dailey's article] challenges
the traditional view of the private domestic sphere that underlies the
contemporary doctrine of constitutional privacy. This alternative view exists
as a competing, subversive strand within both family history and
constitutional case law. It argues that the modem family has never constituted
a purely private institution, but has always been subject to state regulation and
public control. This challenge to the received wisdom concerning the private
nature of family life focuses on the extensive state involvement in the
formation and structure of the family as well as on the family's political role
in both facilitating and constraining governmental power.
Id. at 994.
See also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (discussing the fading distinction between the concepts
of public and private); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:"
Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819 (1985) (challenging the
traditional view that the role of women in American history did not extend beyond the
private family sphere).
171. JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980).
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ications must be grounded in theories about the structuring and protection of the democratic process.
The scope of this section will be limited in two significant ways.
First, this Article will not explore traditional constitutional legal doctrine to discover additional justifications for implementing permanency
planning concepts because constitutional doctrines have failed to
compel legal decision-makers to implement permanency planning
concepts in making decisions in individual cases. Without constitutional recognition of permanency planning concepts,' 72 ,an
exploration of constitutional legal doctrine would provide little
assistance in discovering additional justifications for implementing
permanency planning concepts.
Furthermore, this Article will not explore natural law principles to
find justifications for permanency planning. Although commentators
have identified some mystical natural law claims as sources of parental
rights which is independent of the interests of children,7 3 these natural
law principles do not provide a justification for permanency planning
because of their severely limited usefulness 174 and their focus on the
172. As mentioned earlier, the courts have consistently held that children do not
have a recognized fundamental right to a timely, stable permanent placement. See supra
note 152 and accompanying text.
173. In explaining this limitation, it must be noted that several legal commentators
who have examined familial relationships and the applicable constitutional law
principles have addressed a line of United States Supreme Court decisions which
emphasize the rights of parents. See, e.g., Hafen, Children's Liberation, supra note
169, at 619-26 (discussing, among others, the decisions of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); see also Dailey, supra note 169 (discussing the
constitutional principle of privacy along with some United States Supreme Court
decisions); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property,33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
In trying to identify the special interest of parents recognized by the Court, Hafen
states:
It is quite possible that when family life is involved, some natural law
attitudes linger, even in this age of sociological jurisprudence. . . . The
bearing and raising of children has probably brought people into contact with
some sense of the Infinite, the mysteries of the universe, or Nature-however
one may express it-more than any other human experience. Thus, it is not
surprising that common law judges refer to parental interests as "sacred,"
"natural," or "fundamental" rights.
Hafen, Children's Liberation,supra note 169, at 628.
Despite Hafen's identification of natural law as a possible basis for parental rights and
family autonomy, the author will not explore natural law principles as a justification
because of his opinion that natural law principles do not relate to or justify parental
rights.
174. ELY, supra note 171, at 43-72 (stating that natural law principles are too general
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rights of parents rather than those of children or families.' 75
With these limitations in mind, this section will now examine four
political roles of the family to determine whether any of these roles
provides additional justifications for implementation of permanency
planning concepts.
A. The Family's Role in ProducingGood Citizens and
FacilitatingGovernment Power
Numerous commentators have identified one political role of the
family in American society: the family's responsibility to produce
176
citizens capable of participating in civil society and in political life.
One commentator places this political role for the family at the base of
the constitutional design of the American political system-a design
aimed at securing the democratic process. 77 In this political role, the
family secures and facilitates the democratic process by developing
can make the democratic process work as
children into citizens who
17 8
designed by the framers.

and vague, and in the final analysis, largely reflect the biases and personal views of the
proponent).
175. Permanency planning focuses on the family unit and on the child's need for a
permanent and stable home and on the.family unit. See GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 64,
at 105-11; MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 5. The natural law right raised by Hafen
exists as a special interest of parents, distinct from the interests and welfare of their
children. lafen,.Children's Liberation,supra note l69, at 628.
176. Dailey, supra note 169, at 990-1031; Hafen, Children's Liberation, supra note
169, at 657-58.
177. Dailey, supra note 169, at 1021-22. Professor Dailey states:
The Constitution establishes a governmental structure defined by the
general principles of federalism, separation of powers, and legislative
representation. Specific textual provisions establish a federal government of
The
divided powers within a federal system of dual sovereignties.
Constitution's provisions require congressional elections at the federal level
and a republican form of government at the state level. Democratic selfgovernment lies at the heart of the Constitution's structural guarantees. The
Constitution thus assumes the existence of a citizenry that is willing and able
to participate in a representative democracy, and it is the Supreme Court's role
to review state laws to ensure their consistency with these structural
guarantees.
For a liberal democracy to succeed, however,. it is not enough that
individuals merely have the competence to cast a vote. Rather, as Jean
Elshtain observes, "democracy requires self-governing and self-regulating
citizens rather than obedient subjects." In the United States, the process of
becoming a self-governing individual capable of meaningful political
participation takes place initially and primarily within the family.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
178. Id.
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This political role of the family provides little in. the way of
justification for implementing permanency planning concepts. The
permanency planning concept favoring placement within the biological
family may actually be undermined by this political role. One could
argue that "better" democratic citizens could result from a system that
identified model parents and placed children with these parents at birth
or at the first sign that placement within the biological family would
not result in the development of a good citizen.
In such a system, a public body could develop criteria and standards
to identify model parents to maximize the production of good democratic citizens. These criteria could encompass a wide range of
personal characteristics of potential caretakers such as financial resources, personal hygiene, intellectual skills, interpersonal skills, and
disciplinary techniques. Potential caretakers, who met the specified
criteria, could then be sought, trained, reviewed, and approved in a
way designed to optimize the production of good democratic citizens.
This scenario undermines the strong priority for placing children
within their biological families.
Justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts do
not necessarily have to provide a defense for the current priority for
placement within the biological family. Even if a system of assigned
caretakers who lack a biological connection to the child was adopted,
society could still maintain an autonomous, permanent family model of
child care. 179 This family model could be maintained if state intrusion
extended only to the initial assignment of children to caretakers, with
all subsequent intrusions strictly limited.' 80 This type of system could
actually enhance permanency for children. If the public body emphasized standards and criteria indicating a high degree of long-term
commitment to raising children, the assigned caretakers would likely
be more committed to providing a permanent home for the children
placed with them than would some of the children's biological
179. This Article adopts a broad definition of the term "family," slightly altering the
definition used by James Fishkin. JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND
THE FAMILY 36-37 (1993). A "family" is a community composed of a child and one or
more adults in a close affective relation which is expected to endure at least through
childhood. Id. at 36. Such a family need not include adults with a biological connection
to the child, and may be much more extended than the familiar nuclear family. Id. It need
not include two parents of the opposite sex. Id.
180. The maintenance of this model could be somewhat undermined through any preplacement training process for assigned "model" caretakers. Depending on the degree of
indoctrination concerning parenting methods and skills, the training process could
conceivably extend the effect of state intrusion well beyond the point of placement.
Thus, a system of assigned caretakers could threaten the autonomy component of the
autonomous, permanent family model of child care.
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8

parents. 1 '

The political role of the family as a producer of good citizens does
not, however, mandate the adoption of the autonomous, permanent
assigned caretaker model described above. It does not dictate a familytype model at all. Instead, communal child care arrangements could
theoretically produce good citizens. 82 These arrangements would
exclude a family-type associational institution from a child's life, and
replace it with a community form of child care.
Although this communal arrangement could be quite "permanent" in
some senses, such as physical location, it would not fulfill the underlying rationales of permanency planning concepts. Fundamentally, it
would not provide the environment which allows children to form
primary attachments with a few special, consistent, committed adult
caretakers. 183 Under the best conditions, these communal child care
arrangements would be analogous to a high-quality group home placement, which is one of the lowest priority placement options under
permanency planning concepts. 184 In this publicly-run group home
setting, caretakers would lack the autonomy and sovereignty necessary
for an environment in which children can develop trusting and
permanent attachments with primary caretakers. 85 Thus, the identified
political role of the family in producing good citizens does not provide
a powerful justification for implementing permanency planning concepts and may actually undermine the implementation of such
concepts.

181. The number of biological parents who would actually lose permanent custody of
their children under a system of assigned caretakers depends on the standards and criteria
established for caretakers. Since the majority of biological parents provide adequate
care for their children in many ways and have made a long-term commitment to care for
their children, most biological parents could become the assigned caretakers for their
own children.
182. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (discussing the communal
child-rearing arrangement set out by Plato); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 990
(1975).
183. See Abraham Sagi et al., Sleeping Out of Home in a Kibbutz Communal
Arrangement: It Makes a Difference for Infant-Mother Attachment, 65 CHILD DEV. 992,
992-93 (1994).
184. MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 6, at 47-49.
185. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 31-52 ; Hafen, Children's Liberation,supra
note 169, at 651-52.
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B. The Family's Role in ProducingSocially Diverse Citizens
as a Control On Majority Factions

Several commentators have identified a second political role for the
family. Families "also serve to constrain state power by nurturing
potential resistance to governmental views."' 86 In serving this second
identified political role, the family promotes social diversity and checks
the monolithic authority of the majoritarian state." 7
Contemporary legal commentators have not explored this second
88
role of the family within the American political system rigorously.1
Nonetheless, the family's role of producing socially diverse citizens
who can restrain state power provides interesting possibilities for
developing additional justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts.

186. Dailey, supra note 169, at 996-97; see also Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra
note 169, at 480-81; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J.
1713, 1722-23 (1988). Professor Dailey states:
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed, "the child is not the mere
creature of the State." Our liberal democracy rejects the conformity resulting
from direct state indoctrination; instead it requires intermediate institutions to
initiate individuals into the political life of the state.
The family's role in nurturing the development of responsible civic
individuals is not its only constitutional function. The family also serves the
vital and unique function of instilling in children "the sense of belonging and
having roots in a distinct tradition." These diverse "ways of life" promoted by
differing family traditions in turn nourish our liberal political system. They
exist, of course, in tension with the authority of the state, balancing the
state's power with their potential threat of subversive resistance. As one
commentator has described it, the family is the "sphere of private nonconformity."
The preservation of social diversity is a function which the state cannot
assume without undermining the foundation of democratic liberty.
Dailey, supra note 169, at 1022-23 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
See also HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND
CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO FREUD 97 (1966); John H. Garvey, Child,
Parent,State and the Due Process Clause:An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work,
51 S.CAL. L. REV. 769, 821 (1978).
187. See supra note 186.
188. See Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 169, at 480-81; Wald, supra note
182, at 989-93. Most have glossed over this role of the family with a mere mention. Id.
Even Professor Dailey, who describes this political role more fully, does not rely on this
family role in setting forth her theory of family justice. Dailey, supra note 169, at
1023-24. In fact, she seems to abandon, and even undermine, this role for the family.
See id.
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1. Madison's Faction Theory as a Justification for
Permanency Planning
Social diversity is valued under liberal democratic principles,
because it provides a constraint on state authority. 8 9 James Madison
adapted this component of democratic theory and put it to pragmatic
use in The FederalistNo. 10.'90 Madison identified social diversity as
a constraint on groups of citizens he defined as factions:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.' 91
Factions, by virtue of Madison's
definition, are negative forces in a
192
civil democratic society.
Madison identified two characteristics of individuals that cause factions. First, an individual's reasoning is fallible. 93 Fallible reasoning
leads people to form different opinions on issues. 194 Due to individuals' "self love," they will develop a passion for their opinions, and
form factions to see their opinions enforced. 95 Second, individuals'
faculties differ. 196 Madison asserted that the acquisition of property
depends upon an individual's faculties, and hence, differences in
faculties lead to unequal distribution of property. 197 Unequal distribution of property among individuals results in citizens with different
interests. 198 Citizens with similar economic interests form groups that
pursue specific economic interests at the expense of the true interests
of the community, thus potentially leading to factious action. 99

189.

See DAvID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 1-10 (1984); see

also supra note 186.
190. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 122 (James Madison) (Isaac Krammick ed., Penguin
Books 1987). The Federalist No.10 is recognized as a significant piece of American
political writing. EPSTEIN, supra note 189, at 59-110.
191. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 123.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 123-24.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 123; MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION
58-59 (1987).
196. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 124.
197. Id.
198. Id.; WHITE, supra note 195, at 59 (noting that Madison identified these
differences in economic interests as the most common and durable source of factions.).
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 124.
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Madison asserted that factions were prevalent under the Articles of
Confederation. 2°° He argued that "a factious spirit has tainted our
public administration," and that such a factious spirit constituted a
mortal disease for popular governments.20 ' Madison observed that
this factious spirit led to unsteadiness and injustice within the loose
confederation of states established by the Articles of Confederation.0 2
Madison then explained that a more centralized, well-constructed,
national Union could control the effects of factions.2 3
Madison described in detail how the Federal Constitution would
control the effects of factions. He began by identifying two ways to
control the effects of majority factions: 204 "Either the existence of the
same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest,
must be rendered, by their number or local situation, unable to concert
and carry into effect schemes of oppression.,, 205 Hence, in order to
control majority factions, obstacles must be constructed which will
prevent the formation of these factions, or if a majority faction is
formed, it must be so cumbersome that the difficulties render action
200. Id. at 123. Madison noted:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public and
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good
is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party,
but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
Id.
201. Id. at 122-23.
202. Id. Madison looked at two possible ways to cure factions. Id. at 123. First, the
government could destroy the liberty which is essential to the existence of factions. Id.
Madison quickly rejected this method based on the notion that liberty is essential to
political life, and that the cure would be worse than the disease of factions. Id. Second,
the government could give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Id.
Madison also ruled out this method as completely impracticable. Id. at 123-24.
203. Id. at 126-28.
204. Madison is most concerned with factions consisting of a majority of the
citizens. Id. at 125-26. But under his definition, a faction may consist of either a
majority or minority of the citizens. Id. at 125. Madison recognized that minority
factions may exist and need to be controlled, but he believes they are relatively easy to
control. Id. at 126. "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by
the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote." Id. at 125. For Madison, the difficult case for a proponent of popular
government is presented by a faction that manages to become a majority. WHITE, supra
note 195, at 134. For a critique of Madison's focus on majority factions and an
argument that the control of minority factions is necessary within the present American
political system, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State:
A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994).
205. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 125-26..
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impracticable.2 6 Madison then explained how the large republic
proposed in the federal Constitution would work to control factions
through both of these methods.2 7
First, in a large federal republic, a large number of citizens elects a
small number of representatives.2 8 Madison asserted that this representative form of government would be more likely to thwart majority
factions than a more direct, pure democracy. 20 9 He based this
assertion on his faith in the wisdom of the representatives chosen
from, and chosen by, a relatively large group of citizens.210 Madison
expressed hesitation in implicitly trusting elected representatives and
recognized that large republics do not guarantee control of factions.2 l
Nevertheless, he believed that formation of a large republic was the
best method of ensuring the election of proper guardians of the public
weal.212
Second, Madison argued that the large number of citizens and the
extensive territory which would exist in a large republic could interfere
with faction formation.2 1 3 The probability of citizens forming common
206.

See WHrrE, supra note 195, at 132-35.

207.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 126-27.

208. Id. at 127.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Madison clarified his doubts by asserting:
The effect of the [delegation of government to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations. Under such a regulation it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men
of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or by sinister designs, may, by
intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then
betray the interests of the people.
Id. at 126.
212. Id. at 128. Madison did not view this control as adequate. See supra note 211.
While fit representatives will actively work to achieve the public good, they will not
sufficiently check the negative effects of factions. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note
190, at 125. As David Epstein stated, "the diversity of parties is in Madison's view the
more important solution; its effect is to make each faction too small to successfully
commit injustices." EPSTEIN, supra note 189, at 109.
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 127. Madison stated:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass
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factious motives would be reduced because a large number of citizens
2 14
would more likely have numerous distinct passions and interests.
Even if the majority formed a common factious motive, a republic with
citizens spread out over a wide geographic area would make it very
difficult for a majority of citizens to discover their majority status and
strength, and then act on their common motive.215
These difficulties were largely due to the poor means of transportation and communication which existed in Madison's time.216
Communication to a wide audience could not occur in a private or
semi-private forum.217 Madison believed that extending the sphere of
the republic, by population and territory, would result in significant
barriers both to the formation of factious majorities and to the realistic

within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other. Besides other
impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust
or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in
proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Id. at 127-28.
214.

WHITE, supra note 195, at 141-42; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 190,

at 127.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 128.
216. WHITE, supra note 195, at 142-43.
215.

217.

RICHARD D. BROWN, KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THE DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION IN

EARLY AMERICA 270-71, 1700-1856 (1989). The lack of opportunity for majority
factions to communicate was especially true because of Madison's definition of factious
activity. Factious activity leads to actions against the true public interest. THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 125. When such "unjust or dishonorable
purposes" are involved, communication is even more problematic. Id. at 127-28.
However, current technology allows for private or semi-private communications to a
wide audience. Targeted mass mailings and distributions of videotapes are utilized
regularly by both commercial and political entities. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, From
Right, A Rain of Anti-Clinton Salvos, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1994, at AI; Susan Estrich,
Can it Be Possible? Attack Videos Prove Politics Can Indeed Get Dirtier,L.A. TIMES,
July 3, 1994, at M2; Robert L. Jackson, Falwell Selling Tape that Attacks Clinton, L.A.
TIMES, May 14, 1994, at A4. Teleconferences are also often used by commercial,
political, and educational entities. In addition, computer networks give private
individuals and other entities the ability to communicate to a wide, but self-selected and
interested, audience. See, e.g., Richard Z. Chesnoff, Hatemongering on the Data
Highway, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 1994, at 52; James Coates, Internet
Warning: Double Click with Care, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1994, at 58. These
communications are not completely private because some persons who are not intended
to receive the communication do receive it, but these technologies somewhat appear to
overcome the barriers to disseminating factious communications to a large number of
persons.
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opportunities for factious majorities to act.
Madison's political theories and pragmatic justifications for an
extended republic have withstood the test of time within the American
political system. 219 However, as rapid changes in technology occur,
the problem of majority factions may threaten minority interests and
the larger public interest, as it did in the state governments under the
Articles of Confederation. Modem transportation and communication
technologies create a greater possibility that Madison's safeguards may
be overcome.22°
2. Modem Application of Madison's Faction Theory
Madison's faction theory sets forth two pivotal safeguards by which
the formation of large republics would serve to control majority
factions. 22 ' Although the first safeguard-election of a small number
of representatives by a large number of citizens-remains in place
today, use of this method to control majority factions is inadequate for
the same reasons that it was inadequate in Madison's time. 2 For this
reason, it will not be explored further. Madison's second method of
majority faction control consists of two aspects: (1) the large number
of citizens in a large republic; and (2) the extensive territory in a large
republic. 223 One aspect of this safeguard-a large number of
218. EPSTEIN, supra note 189, at 99-107; WHITE, supra note 195, at 141-45.
219. See EPSTEIN, supra note 189, at 59-110.
220. The potential for the development of a majority faction is most evident in the
recent debate concerning the federal government's budget deficit. One could argue quite
convincingly that the permanent and aggregate interests of the community require
elimination or reduction of the budget deficit. Although most citizens may agree with
this long-term interest, many groups affected by any actions designed to achieve this
long-term interest have mobilized to protect the federal programs that provide them With
benefits. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Clinton Considers Curbs on Social Security Cost of
Living Raises, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at A9; Eric Pianin, Deficit-Cutting Wilts in
Heat from Voters: Entitlements Remain Mostly Off-Limits, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1992,
at Al; Gerald F. Seib & Michael K. Frisby, Selling Sacrifice: As Opponents Gear Up,
Clinton Prepares Pitchfor His Economic Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1993, at Al.
As Judge Easterbrook pointed out, this type of phenomena may actually present a
problem of powerful minority factions. Easterbrook, supra note 204, at 1334-35; see
THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM:

THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES

271-313 (1979). Thus, the structure of American government must now provide
effective means for the control of both majority and minority factions. Judge
Easterbrook focuses on the structure of government itself, but it can certainly be argued
that a wide diversity of individual citizens also assists in controlling powerful minority
factions since a broad range of powerful minority factions will have the effect of
insulating government from the influence of any particular faction.
221. See supra notes 204-20 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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citizens-still exists today. This safeguard is significantly diminished,
however, through the elimination of an extended territory.
Although the United States has grown geographically since
Madison's day, it has, in a crucial sense, become much smaller. Citizens can travel cross-country much more quickly, conveniently, and
frequently. More importantly, technology has led to an astounding
increase in the amount and ease of communication among individual
citizens. Communication occurs instantaneously via telephone, fax
machine, or computer networks. These instantaneous communications
are sent to and received by a very large audience. The explosion in
communications extends far beyond communications for which the
intended receiver is an individual or a small group. Television and
nationwide print media allow millions of citizens to receive the same
information simultaneously. These technological developments significantly reduce the geographical barriers to travel and communication
which Madison relied upon to control majority factions.
Mass media communications also affect the control of factions
provided by a large number of citizens. Clearly, the American population has grown since Madison's time. American citizens, however,
are no longer geographically isolated in small groups that receive
distinct inputs which help form their opinions and develop their
interests.224 A large number of citizens now receives the same informational inputs within a matter of minutes. 225 Therefore, mass media
curtails individuals' formation of distinct opinions and interests. 6
224. One of the most vivid examples of this is in the area of consumer trends.
National advertising and news reports concerning available products sometimes result in
certain products experiencing extremely high demand at a specific point in time (e.g.,
Christmas). See, e.g., Catalogs Picked Clean of Cabbage Patch Dolls, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 1984; Jura Koncius, Power Up Rangers, Power Up!, WASH. POST, July 21,
1994, at T5; Joseph Pereira, Tough Game: Toy Industry Finds It's Harder and Harder to
Pick the Winners, WALL ST. J.,Dec. 21, 1993, at Al. The effect of these broad
communications goes well beyond the creation of high demand for specific products. It
includes the creation of a widely-held belief that a high rate of consumption is a major
goal in life. See Juliet B. Schor, Life's Larcenies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1994, § 7, at 10
(reviewing BARRY SCHWARTZ, How MARKET FREEDOM ERODES THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE
(1994)).
225. See supra note 224.
226. Certainly this safeguard has not been eliminated. As Madison asserted,
individual citizens have the ability to form different opinions based on the same
information, and they possess different faculties that give rise to diverse interests.
However, the reduction in the variability of informational inputs somewhat weakens
Madison's safeguard against majority factions that is based on a large number of citizens
possessing diverse opinions and interests. This is especially true as mass media
communications consist of opinions which are expressed in as convincing a manner as
possible. Michael Harrison, The Voice of America, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1994, at 19;
Michiko Kakutani, Critic's Notebook: Opinion vs. Reality in an Age of Pundits, N.Y.
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In a free society, the government cannot squelch the ingenuity of
citizens because a free society depends on this ingenuity to reduce the
barriers to majority factions. The control on majority factions provided by an extended territory has disappeared. In addition, it has
become risky to rely completely on the mere existence of a large
number of citizens who possess diverse opinions and interests. Thus,
there appears to be a current need for the discovery of other controls
on majority factions.
Control of majority factions depends on wide diversity in human
reasoning and faculties. 227 The family unit plays a pivotal role in
developing an individual citizen's reasoning and faculties. 22' Therefore, future control of factious behavior may depend largely on
society's protection of diverse family environments.
3. Family as a New Safeguard
As Madison's controls become less reliable,229 the American political system must rely, at least in part, on other sources for diverse
citizens to control majority factions. The extended American republic
promotes the development of diverse opinions and interests through a
wide array of intermediate associational institutions.230 Intermediate
associational institutions are groups of individual citizens which
mediate between individual citizens standing alone, and the state or
society as a whole.23 ' One of the basic intermediate associational
institutions in American society is the family. 232 Within the family, a
Jan. 28, 1994, at Cl; David Remnick, Day of the Dittohead: Rush Limbaugh
Entertains, But His Mean, ConspiratorialMessage Has a Serious Future, WASH. POST,
Feb. 20, 1994, at C1.
227. See supra part V.B.1.
228. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 13-16; PETER K. SMITH & HELEN COWIE,
TIMES,

UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 59-86, 310-44 (1988).

229. See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
230. ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL

1-40 (1982); POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 1-25 (James W.
Skillen & Rockne M. McCarthy eds., 1991).
231. DAHL, supra note 230, at 1-40; POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF
SOCIETY, supra note 230, at 1-25. Although the classic definition of intermediate
associational institutions stresses the relationship between the individual and the state,
this Article uses an expanded definition which includes the relationship between the
individual and "society." By using this expanded definition, this Article intends to also
focus on the role of intermediate associational institutions in mediating between
individuals and society-wide forces such as the mass media.
232. See supra note 230. Of course, the family unit is not the only associational
setting in which an individual's early development occurs. Certainly other intermediate
associational institutions, such as schools, churches, and informal peer associations,
affect an individual child's development.
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child becomes attached to others and develops an individual personality and individual skills.233 These attachments and personal
developments provide the basis for the subsequent formation of
individual opinions, passions, and interests.234 Families provide an
important setting for the development of individuals' physical and
mental skills, their opinions on government and religion, their
economic interests, and their ability to form attachments. 235 Especially
in the crucial early years of life, the family acts as the intermediate
associational institution in American society which
provides the core
236
occurs.
development
individual
which
in
setting
The family's central role in the development of an individual's
opinions and interests is crucial because Madison relied on a wide
diversity of opinions and interests to control factions. To develop different opinions and interests, individuals require different reasoning
approaches and faculties which are developed mainly during child238
hood. 237 The family environment greatly affects this development.
Society's protection and support of diverse family environments may
provide a significant control on factious action in the future for two
reasons: (1) the control of majority factions depends upon a wide
diversity in human reasoning and faculties; and (2) the family unit
plays a pivotal role in the development of an individual citizen's
reasoning.
This political role of the family helps to explain the line of Supreme
Court privacy decisions that arise out of the family setting and construct a zone of freedom from state intrusion.239 Under this theory, the
233. See BOWLBY, supra note 71, at 322-71; FAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 20-60;
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 13-16.
234. See BOWLBY, supra note 71, at 322-71; FAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 20-60.
235. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 13-16; Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 635-37 (1980).
236. See generally BOWLBY, supra note 71 (establishing a theory of human and child
psychology); FAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 69-80 (discussing the importance of family
attachments during a child's first years); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 669-76
(discussing child development in the context of the impact of a proposed child
placement system).
237. SMITH & COWIE, supra note 228, at 280; BARRY J. WADSWORTH, PIAGET'S
THEORY OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT 9-18 (3d ed. 1984); DAVID WOOD,

How CHILDREN THINK AND LEARN 37-42 (1988).
238. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 13-16; SMITH & COWIE, supra note 228,
at 276-344; Karst, supra note 235, at 635-37.
239. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a more extensive description of this line
of cases see Dailey, supra note 169, at n.3 & 33 (stating that the family "has established
itself as a central focus of heightened constitutional concern in a line of cases affirming
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zone of family freedom from state intrusion does not emanate from
principles of natural law or traditional liberalism, but from a role for
the family within the American political system which requires a
degree of freedom from state intrusion. 2" The constitutional protection of a zone of family "privacy," "autonomy," or "freedom from
state intrusion, 24' allows the family to fulfill the political role of
producing diverse individuals.242 This political role requires a certain
degree of family freedom from state intrusion. 243
One must acknowledge that the construction of a zone of family
freedom from state intrusion will result in harm to many children.
In some situations, the family will ignore, neglect, or abuse the children emotionally or physically.2 45 In other situations, the family will
push some children relentlessly to achieve in certain endeavors, to the
exclusion of other activities necessary for a well-rounded life
experience. 246
the importance of the family as a fundamental social unit.").
240. Commentators have recently noted the troubling aspects of grounding a zone of
family freedom on principles of individual liberalism or natural law. See Dailey, supra
note 169; Hafen, Children's Liberation, supra note 169.
241. This Article uses the term "zone of freedom from state intrusion." The terms
"zone of privacy" or "zone of autonomy" are confusing in the sense that these terms can
be both individual and family-focused. If focused on the individual, principles of
"privacy" and "autonomy" can conflict within the family setting. See Hafen, Children's
Liberation,supra note 169, at 610-44; Dailey, supra note 169, at 981. A "zone of
freedom from state intrusion" is more clearly centered on the family unit, while avoiding
the confusion with individual rights terms and principles.
242. See supra note 186.
243. Defining the limits of this zone of family freedom presents a public policy
issue. As one legal commentator has noted, the public and private spheres are not
clearly separated, and a well-designed public sphere creates and allows certain private
spheres to exist. Frank Michelman, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus
Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783, 1792-94 (1990).
244. The likelihood of this outcome for a large number of children is evidenced by
the number of child maltreatment reports. In 1992, there were 2.9 million reports of
child maltreatment, with 40% to 55% of these reports eventually substantiated. GREEN
BOOK, supra note 50, at 636.

245. See supra note 244.
246. See, e.g., Sally Jenkins, Teenage Confidential: For Jennifer Capriati, a Losing
Semifinalist at the Lipton Tournament, 16 is Anything but Sweet, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
Mar. 30, 1992, at 26; Peter King, The End Zone, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 16, 1992, at

62; Franz Lidz, Will She Be a Smash?: Next Month 13-year-old Jennifer Capriati Will
Begin Her Quest to Become Next in the Line of U.S. Women Tennis Champions, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 12, 1990, at 88; Douglas S. Looney, Bred to be a Superstar: Todd
Marinovich Was Groomed from Infancy to be a Top-notch Quarterback, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 2, 1988, at 56; Douglas S. Looney, The Minefield: For USC
Quarterback Todd Marinovich, Fame and Talent May Not be Enough to See Him Safely
Through, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 3, 1990, at 48; S.L. Price, Lost Weekend: The
Party's Over for a Troubled Jennifer Capriati, Who Wanted to be Like Other Kids-the
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No one can predict how each individual child will emerge from
diverse family backgrounds.247 However, it is clear that each individual raised in a family largely free from state intrusion will bring
distinct reasoning skills and faculties to the social and political
community."4 For example, a neglected child may become a psychologically dysfunctional individual, lacking the ability to relate to others
or may become an extremely competent, strong, self-reliant person.249
An economically deprived child may become an individual who is
completely unaware of and uninterested in others or may become a
person who brings unique and healthy insights to the social and
political community.250 Although no one can predict the outcome of
each child raised in diverse family backgrounds, this developmental
diversity, rather than geographic breadth, will provide a check on
factious behavior in the future.
As the primary safeguard that Madison relied on becomes less
reliable, the American political system must begin to rely, at least in
part, on the family as the source of diverse citizens who will control
majority factions. Some of the major tenets of permanency planning
help ensure the continuation of families' political role in producing
individuals with diverse opinions and interests.
4. Permanency Planning Concepts: Helping to Assure Diversity
Madison's faction theory directly implicates the public child welfare
system. The need to secure the boundaries of the zone of family
privacy that allows the family to serve its political role justifies implementing some of the fundamental components of permanency planning
concepts. One permanency planning concept not only gives biological
parents initial custody of their children if possible, but constructs a
Wrong Kind, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 30, 1994, at 14.
247. See generally THE INVULNERABLE CHILD (E. James Anthony & Bertram J. Cohler
eds., 1987).
248. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
249. Examples of individuals who have experienced neglect during childhood and
have become competent adults are numerous. The author personally has observed a
significant subset of the Clinic's child clients who function competently in most areas
of life (school, work, intimate relationships) despite experiencing neglect earlier in
life. The author's most vivid personal example of this possibility is his father. Despite
a childhood characterized by severe neglect and abandonment, the author's father is an
exceptionally strong, self-reliant adult who provided the author and his sister with an
extremely nurturing home environment. See generally THE INVULNERABLE CHILD, supra
note 247.
250. See, e.g., Lou CANNON, REAGAN (1982); ROBERT E. LEVIN, BILL CLINTON: THE
INSIDE STORY (1992); SANYIKA SHAKUR, MONSTER (1993); BRENT STAPLES, PARALLEL TIME
(1993).
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high barrier to state disruption of this initial custody assignment."'
This convention serves the same function as a random number
generator which assigns children to caretakers.252 Randomness
precludes overwhelming state interference in the family. Retaining
biological parental custody prevents the state from making family
environments "optimal," and more importantly, standardized, uniform,
and fungible. 3
In addition, under permanency planning, only if a child is at
"serious risk of substantial harm" 4 should the family be compelled to
participate in services narrowly tailored to reduce the risk of harm to
the child. 5 If this goal can be accomplished while the child lives in
the parental home, the child must remain in that home. 6 However, if
services cannot reduce the risk in the parental home to an acceptable
level, the child must be removed. 7
A second concept of permanency planning secures the political role
of the family even when children are removed from their homes and
placed in foster care. Permanency planning requires caseworkers to
quickly place children in permanent homes free from state intervention

25 1. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
252. The random selection of biological parents can be seen in contrast to the earlier
discussion in which a state could assign the "best" caretakers for every child. See supra
part V.A. The state could train and license parents, and ensure a certain economic level
for all children. Id.
253. This initial random assignment of children to biological parents does not
theoretically preclude the state from guaranteeing a certain minimal economic level for
each child. The federal government has attempted to achieve this goal through the Aid
for Dependent Children ("AFDC") program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994). However,
this program has been woefully inadequate in raising children out of poverty. See STATE
OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 130, at 1-2. In 1992, 21.9% of children lived in
households with income below the federal Department of Health and Human Services
poverty guideline. Id. Combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefits provided a family with
a household income that amounted to 70% of the poverty guideline. Id. Under current
fiscal realities, the assignment of children to their biological parents precludes the state
from securing certain minimum and adequate economic level for each child. See BEYOND
RHETORIC, supra note 130, at 113-15 (noting that a comprehensive family income
security plan would require $40 billion to $44 billion a year in government
expenditures).
254. The term "serious risk of substantial harm" should be defined in a very narrow
way. For a full discussion concerning the appropriate standards for state intervention,
see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979); Wald,
supra note 23, at 642; Michael S. Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and
Neglect of Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 645, 652-57 (1980).
255. Wald, supra note 23, at 643.
256. Id. at 651.
257. Id.
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and control. 8 Under permanency planning concepts, foster homes
do not qualify as permanent homes since they are designed to serve as
temporary placements.259 Moreover, foster homes do not qualify
under Madison's faction theory since they are under the direct control
of the state. 26° The timely placement of children in permanent homes
258. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(1), 675(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
259. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
260. The foster care system is a highly regulated system that directly controls foster
parents through detailed training and monitoring. Most states specifically mandate the
method and number of hours of foster parent training.
California-Although there are no state requirements for training of foster parents,
each county may mandate training. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16507.7 (West 1993).
Such training may be no longer than six months in duration and shall meet for a
"specified number of hours determined by each program." Id. The training must also
cover the topic areas listed in the code. Id.
Florida-30 hours training are mandated within one year of being issued a license.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IOM - 6.022 (1992). Group Preparation and Selection or GPSMAPP is the preservice training program selected by the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services. Id. r. 10M - 6.017.
Illinois-Training programs are now being drafted by the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services pursuant to a federal consent decree entered in the case of
B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. 111.1989).
lowa-12 hours of preservice training and 6 hours of in-service training are required
prior to each renewal of a license. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-117.1(2)(b) (1987). Two
additional hours of training are required every five years on child abuse identification and
reporting. Id. r. 441-112.10(2). The Nova University Foster Parent Project training
program "Preparation for Fostering: Preservice Education for Foster Families" is the
recommended program. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-117.1(2)(a) (1993).
Michigan-While only 6 hours of training are required for certification, 18 additional
hours of training are required within 2 years of receiving the original license. MICH.
ADMIN. CODE r. 400.6226 (State of Michigan, Department of Social Services, Licensing
Rules for Child Placing Agencies) (1992). Proposed rules require 12 hours of training to
be completed not later than the end of the initial 6-month licensing period, with another
12 hours required within the next two years.
New York-Foster parents providing care in designated emergency foster family
boarding homes must complete 15 hours of training within four months of being
designated as such. A minimum of six hours of yearly follow-up training expands upon
the areas covered during the initial training. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 446.5 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
These states all list designated areas that training must cover, including child
development, child discipline, rights and responsibilities of foster parents,
communication, separation and the importance of the child's own family, family
systems, reasons for placement termination and the feelings involved in such a
termination, crisis intervention and assessment skills, handling stress and anger,
caseworkers and their role, team effort of foster parents and caseworkers, permanency
planning, adoption issues, and participation in foster care reviews. See, e.g., CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16507.7; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 10m - 6.023; IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 441-117.7(2); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.

400.6226;

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.

tit. 18, § 446.5.
In addition, these states regulate almost every aspect of daily life in the foster care
setting. For example: In Michigan, heating, ventilation, and light shall be "sufficient
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relatively free from state intervention is consistent with Madison's
theory. Only with timely permanent placement resolution can the
family fully perform its political role for children in the public child
welfare system.
Furthermore, in light of the political role of the family in producing
diverse individuals, and consistent with permanency planning concepts, the priority for returning a child to a biological parent26' should
to provide a comfortable airy atmosphere," MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.192(7) (1993);
furnishings and housekeeping standards shall be "such that the home presents a clean
orderly appearance," ld.; in New York, the type of bedding shall be "comfortable" and
"have suitable springs in good condition," N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
444.5(10) (1991); in Florida, the number of beds shall be one per child, Id.; FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. IOM 6.025(14); adequate disposal of garbage and refuse, MICH. ADMIN.
CODE r. 400.192(1 1); refrigeration for perishable foods, Id.; purchase only pasteurized
milk, cream, and milk products, Id. r. 413.192(13); daily routine shall be "such as to
promote good health, rest and play habits," Id. r. 400.194(27); the daily diet shall be
"varied, adequate and wholesome and it shall include sufficient quantities of milk, eggs,
meats, fruits, vegetables, whole grain cereals, and breads," Id. r. 400.194(31); screens
on all windows and outside doors during the summer months, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 444.5(b)(13) (1991); "there shall be a written policy which assures that
foster children are permitted to send and receive mail," MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.6209
(1992); clothing shall be appropriate to the seasons and "of such style and quality as not
to distinguish them from other children in the community," N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 444.5(c)(6); supply of water of satisfactory sanitary quality for drinking
and household use, d. § 444.5(b)(12); heating apparatus shall be "adequate and safe to
insure a temperature of at least 68 degrees," Id. § 444.5(b)(14); adequate and sanitary
bathing, toilet, and lavatory facilities, Id. § 444.5(b)(15); existence of at least one
smoke detector, FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IOM 6.025(16)(F)(2); no corporal
punishment-"problems of child training should be handled with sympathy and
understanding," MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.194(33) (1993). One Michigan regulation
provides that "no room shall be used for living purposes where more than 1/2 the room
height is below grade for more that 25% of the perimeter measurement of the home. All
sleeping rooms shall have a window of a type that may be opened readily and is
accessible for evacuation." MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.192(9) (1992).
Most states mandate monitoring of the foster care home through visits by social
workers or caseworkers, usually on a monthly basis. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.6252.
Some states mandate that foster parents agree to periodic unannounced visits, while
other states require yearly unannounced visits as a requirement in relicensing foster
homes. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-113.15(1). Michigan mandates that foster parents
agree to admit representatives of the health department or fire marshal's office into their
home at any time for purpose of inspection. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.192(6).
See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16507.7 (West 1993); FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 10m - 6.010 F.A.C. (1992); IOWA ADMIN CODE r. 441-117.1(2)(a) (1993); MICH.
ADMIN. CODE r. 400.192(9) (1992); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 443.1 to
444.8 (1988 & 1993 Supp.).
261. Permanency planning concepts place a high priority on biological family
reunification. See supra part III.B. This priority reinforces society's initial random
assignment of children. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. Reunification
demonstrates society's commitment to the efficient production of diverse individuals,
even though it exposes children to a risk of harm that could be avoided. See supra part
V.B.3. The system is not designed to achieve the best possible outcome for each
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only persist in cases where the state intervenes with narrowly tailored
services, 6'and where the child's return home can be expected within
a short, well-defined period of time.263 In cases where these are
unreasonable expectations, decision-makers should pursue other
permanent placement options immediately. 26
5. Effect of Present Child Welfare Procedures on
Faction Theory
Both theoretical and philosophical justifications compel implementing permanency planning based on Madison's The FederalistNo.
10. However, because Madison wrote The FederalistNo. 10 with a
very pragmatic goal in mind-to encourage the adoption of the
proposed Constitution 26 -the pragmatic implications must be examined before using The Federalist No. 10 as a justification for
permanency planning. Despite being a valid justification on a
individual child, but to achieve family independence and individual diversity. See id.
This design encourages governmental actors to restrain themselves when they would
otherwise intervene aggressively to secure an optimal, uniform child care setting for
each child. See id. The governmental restraint is desirable since extensive government
intervention would undermine the political role of the family in producing widely
diverse individuals.
262. In certain cases, children can be returned to a biological parent if the state
provides extensive services. For example, the students in the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law's Child Welfare Law Clinic who represented a mentally disabled
biological parent reunified the child and the biological parent by placing both in a statefunded foster care placement. This type of reunification, while on the surface fulfilling
some of the components of permanency planning concepts, raises serious issues under
the political role of the family theory developed in this part. In such a reunification
placement, the degree of state intervention remains extremely high and, if achieved in a
large number of cases, could raise a threat to the family's political role in producing
diverse individuals.
263. A child's caretaker should be regulated by the state only for a short period of
time; otherwise, regulation poses a threat to the development of diverse individuals.
Quite often, the allowable length of this period is rather arbitrary, and not directly based
on child development principles. However, the allowable length of time could coincide
with the time period dictated by child development principles-6 to 18 months. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
264. Well-designed state child welfare laws currently provide for swift resolution of
cases where the child cannot return to the custody of a biological parent. For example,
Michigan's child welfare statutes expressly provide that termination of parental rights
may be sought as early as the initial disposition hearing, and that in all cases the court
must conduct a permanency hearing within the first six months of an initial disposition
order placing the child outside the custody of the biological parents. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 710.56 (West 1993).
265. Finding a pragmatic justification is especially important because Madison was a
noted pragmatist. WHITE, supra note 195, at 45. Madison wrote The FederalistNo. 10 to
provide a compelling justification for the adoption of the new Constitution. THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 190, at 3. In light of Madison's pragmatic approach and
purpose in The FederalistNo. 10, pragmatic considerations must be addressed.
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theoretical and philosophical level, The FederalistNo. 10 is a less
valid justification on a pragmatic level.
One of the primary goals of permanency planning is to achieve
timely permanent placement for children,2 6 thereby reducing or
eliminating foster care drift. 267 The number of children experiencing
foster care drift is a very small percentage of the overall population of
children.268 Thus, it can be argued that the effect of foster care
placement and drift on society's ability to produce diverse citizens,
which is required to control factious behavior, is inconsequential. One
can even assert that the relatively small subset of children who
experience state parenting effectively results in wider diversity. Children who experience long-term public child care will develop
reasoning and faculties that are remarkably different from those
developed by children raised in families largely free from state
intrusion. 269 Therefore, on a pragmatic level, foster care drift may not
pose society-wide problems for the political role of the family.
On the other hand, although the total number of children who
experience foster care drift is small, more children from poor and
minority families experience such placements.27 On a pragmatic level,
266. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 28 for the definition of foster care drift.
268. At the end of federal government fiscal year 1990, the latest point in time for
which reliable statistics are available, 0.61% of the total U.S. child population (persons
18 years old or younger) lived in foster care placements. See GREEN BOOK, supra note
50, at 640 tbl. #!4-!4.
269. See M. Bohman & S. Sigvarsson, A Proposed Longitudinal Study of Children
Registered for Adoption: A 15-Year Follow-up, in ANNUAL PROGRESS IN CHILD
PSYCHIATRY AND DEVELOPMENT 217, 217 (Stella Chess & Alexander Thomas eds., 1981)
(concluding that there is a considerably higher risk of maladjustment for foster children
as compared to adoptees); Anne Keanne, Behavior Problems Among Long-Term Foster
Children, 7 ADOPT. AND FOSTERING 53 (1983) (finding a rate of 30% of disturbance in
foster children was significantly higher than the 7% rate for children in the general
population); Herring, supra note 28, at 146-50 (discussing three empirical studies that
compared children who had grown up in long-term foster care to adoptees and children in
the general population); John Triseliotis, Identity and Security in Adoption and Longterm Fostering, 7 ADOPT. AND FOSTERING 22 (1983) (concluding that the ambiguous
nature of foster care seemed to have a qualitative impact on the foster children's sense of
identity).
270. For example, at the end of federal government fiscal year 1990, 407,000
children lived in foster care. GREEN BOOK, supra note 50, at 640 tbl. #14-14. At that
time, 14.3 million children lived in poverty. STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note
130, at 1. Assuming that all children placed in foster care were from families
experiencing poverty (not a wildly unrealistic assumption, see PELTON, supra note 87, at
63-64), children placed in foster care represented 2.8% of the total population of
children living in poverty.
As an additional example, approximately 36.5% of the children in foster care are
African-American, while only 14.6% of the total United States child population is
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public child welfare interventions target these distinct segments of the
population.217 1 This targeting may significantly reduce the range of
family situations and limit the production of diverse individuals.272
Children who would have otherwise experienced certain cultural
and/or economic family settings are "saved" by the state and placed in
a mostly white middle-class family environment.273 Implementing
African-American. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 99, at 11. Based on these
numbers, at the end of federal government fiscal year 1990, 148,600 African-American
children lived in foster care (36.5% x 407,000 children in foster care) out of a total
African-American child population of 9,818,000 (14.6% x 67,246,000 children in the
United States population), see GREEN BOOK, supra note 50, at 640 tbl. #14-14. Based on
these numbers, the African-American children placed in foster care represented 1.5% of
the total population of African-American children. These examples only indicate, and
do not provide a complete picture of, the extent of foster care placements in these
communities, because they rely on the number of children living in foster care at a
specific point in time. This number does not include all children affected by foster care
placements since many children enter foster care and leave. See PELTON, supra note 87,
at 54. For example, in fiscal year 1989, 222,000 children entered substitute care, and
182,000 left substitute care. VCIS CHARACTERISTICS 1993, supra note 50, at ix-x.
271. See PELTON, supra note 87, at xiii-xiv, 165-77; Gray & Nybell, supra note 101,
at 513-22; Hogan & Siu, supra note 101, at 493-96.
272. See supra note 271.
273. See PELTON, supra note 87, at ix-xvii. State regulations generally do not
explicitly assert a preference for a middle-class family environment. However, the
language of the licensing rules for foster family homes reveals this preference. The type
of foster parent, the type of foster home, and the type of neighborhood environment are
often addressed in state regulations. While states do not require a certain type of foster
parent, the existence of certain detailed standards effectively eliminate the possibility of
persons from lower socioeconomic classes becoming foster parents. For example,
Michigan's regulations provide:
(18) The foster family should be composed of a father and mother about the
same age as parents bringing up their own children. The applicant shall not be
over 65 years of age.
(21) The foster mother shall not accept employment outside of the home
which would affect adversely the quality of care given a foster child. The foster
mother or another member of the family must be able to demonstrate that they
have adequate time for the care of foster children.
(24) The financial status of the foster family must be secure; there must be
some definite income which is adequate to care for the family needs.
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.193 (1992).
States regulate the physical foster home environment as well as the type of foster
parents that they seek. Through detailed regulations, states define the types of homes
and atmospheres most desirable for foster children. The regulations discussed in note
260, supra, reveal a preference for middle-class conditions in a foster home. Using
words like "wholesome," in regard to diet, "comfortable airy atmosphere," in regard to
the home atmosphere, furnishing and housekeeping standards, described as being "such
that the home presents a clean orderly appearance," and emphasizing a daily routine to
promote "good health, rest and play habits in children," all seem to promote a happy,
healthy, middle-class family living situation. See supra note 260. A Michigan
regulation, like regulations in other states, calls for, "[p]lay space, fenced if necessary,
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permanency planning concepts minimizes state intervention in these
targeted groups, thus helping to ensure a wider diversity of citizens.
Nevertheless, even within the targeted populations, public child
welfare intervention directly affects only a small percentage of
children. 4 Therefore, one could argue that minimizing these interventions is not necessary to ensure the wide diversity of citizens
needed to help control majority factions.
The public child welfare system also indirectly affects children
living in families with much broader characteristics. Public child
welfare cases and practices receive media attention.275 Through this
media attention, families who are not directly affected by child welfare
interventions learn a great deal about what actors in the public child
welfare system consider appropriate parenting behavior. 76 Parents
shall be available and free from hazards which might be dangerous to the life and health
of the child. The play area shall be kept free from litter, rubbish and inflammable
material at all times." MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.192(14) (1992). This emphasis on
the physical surroundings reflects middle-class standards concerning safe and comfortable physical surroundings.
Not only do states seek to regulate the foster home environment, but they also have
regulations regarding the types of neighborhoods in which foster homes should be
located. For example, a New York regulation provides, "(11) The home shall be situated
in a neighborhood with sufficient community resources to meet a child's anticipated
social, educational, recreational, and religious needs." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 444.5 (1992).
Middle-class status items and activities also get some special attention. For example,
New York allows for special payments to be made for "necessary" items not covered by
the regular board and care and clothing allowances, and lists as examples: special attire
for proms; school expenses, such as the costs of field trips, school jewelry, pictures,
and yearbooks; music, art and dancing lessons; and the purchase or rental of such items
needed to take part in these activities. The state promotes the belief that these items and
activities should be part of a child's life by making extra payments available for foster
children to be able to engage in these activities and to have these items. N.Y.
STANDARDS OF PAYMENTS FOR FOSTER CARE MANUAL, ch. 8, § B, at 10, 10-11 (Sept.
1991).
By eliminating some types of environments and prospective foster parents through
regulation, the states, to a large degree, ensure that foster children will live in a middleclass environment. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 10m - 6.010 F.A.C. (1992);
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.192(9) (1992); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 443.1-444.8 (1988 & 1993 Supp.); DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVS., STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, DIVISION 31 CHILD WELFARE SERVICES PROGRAM;
DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVS., STATE OF IOWA, FOSTER FAMILY HOME LICENSING.

274. Approximately 2.8% of the children living in poverty are placed in foster care
and approximately 1.5% of African-American children are placed in foster care. See
supra note 270.
275. For examples, see infra notes 426-29, 433 and accompanying text.
276. Examples of such behavior include disciplining children without the use of
corporal punishment, closely supervising young children at all times, and avoiding the
use of illicit substances. See Gray & Nybell, supra note 101, at 515-19; Wald, supra
note 182, at 1000-24.
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who wish to avoid state interventions may adjust their behavior
accordingly. This phenomenon arguably tends to standardize family
parenting behavior and reduce the diversity of family child care
settings. 7 Implementing permanency planning concepts minimizes
this phenomenon by providing a clear demonstration of society's commitment to, and respect for, diverse family associations largely free
from state intrusion.278 In this way, permanency planning reinforces
the family's political role in producing diverse individuals who will
control factious behavior. Again, on a pragmatic level, however, it
can be persuasively argued that the effect of child welfare case
publicity on actual parenting behavior, if any, is insignificant in terms
of altering family environments in a way that truly threatens the
production of a sufficient number of widely diverse citizens.2 79
In summary, The Federalist No. 10 provides a fairly powerful
justification for permanency planning concepts on a theoretical and
philosophical level. On a pragmatic basis, however, The Federalist
No. 10 justification is weak. This weakness is bolstered by an
inability to demonstrate a real threat to either American society or the
American political system caused by excessive public child welfare
system interventions or unplanned long-term foster care placements.
C. The Family and the ProperFunctioningof a Large Pluralistic
Democracy: Group and AssociationalTheories
Not all groups of citizens meet Madison's negative definition of a
faction.28 0 While factions are groups, some groups bring about
positive effects in the political arena 28 by identifying diverse issues
and developing solutions which serve the true interests of the
community. 82 Madison recognized this positive role for groups of
284
citizens. 283 He wished to control majority action, not to eliminate it.
277. This tendency would likely be most pronounced in the targeted communities
where public child welfare agencies are known to be most active. See supra note 273 and
accompanying text.
278. See Wald, supra note 182, at 989-1000.
279. This argument would be strongly supported by the large number of reports of
suspected child abuse and neglect in current American society, despite child welfare case
publicity. See supra note 244.
280. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONFLICT AND CONSENT 22, 22-24 (1967); Robert Presthus, The Pluralist Framework,in
FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 285, 285-89 (Henry S. Kariel ed., 1970).
281. See, e.g., MICHAEL FOLEY, AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS: TRADITIONS AND USAGES
85-87 (1991); Lowi, supra note 220, at 34-35.
282. See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-87; Lowi, supra note 220, at 34-35.
283. WHITE, supra note 195, at 137.
284. Id.
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Diverse groups play two positive roles in the American political
system-a system characterized as democratic pluralism. A5 First,
groups provide a collective voice, which works to affect decisions in
the pluralistic political arena.286 Second, groups of citizens insulate
individuals from pervasive state intrusion and control. 28
7
In the first instance, individuals form a group. The group then
speaks for the individuals collectively. If the collective voice is sufficiently powerful, the group affects the political decisions made within
a large, democratic, pluralistic political system. The system of group
action within a pluralistic democracy has received both attention and
criticism from political theorists.288
Commentators agree that groups play a powerful role in the American political system."' Critics of pluralistic democracy focus on the
lack of broad group participation in the political process. 290 These
critics argue that narrow, powerful economic interest groups, such as
corporations, have inordinate influence within the political system,
285. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 87. Democratic pluralism is a difficult term to define.
One commentator has recently described pluralism as follows:
Pluralism is a broad and notoriously diffuse term, but in this particular
context, it is used to refer to a conception of politics and government which
views society as a collection of distinct, yet interrelated and interacting parts.
The constituent units amount to an amalgam of interests. Interests may
compete and conflict with one another. They may, on the other hand, simply
transcend one another. But together, they have a cultural identity and share an
agreed form of social conduct through which they achieve a state of coexistence. To the pluralist, these social units do not add up to an integrated
and corporate whole. Neither do they accumulate to form a stratified social and
political hierarchy. The value of such units lies in their provision of social
and political diversity which prevents any aggregation of interests
developing into a permanent form of class dominion. The pluralist
conception of society, therefore, sees a vast profusion of group interests
represented and embodied by political groups, none of which has the power to
prevail over the rest. Because they are obliged to accommodate one another
by extensive negotiations, it ensures that no one center of sovereign power
can emerge.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Robert Presthus provided a more straightforward definition.
According to Presthus, pluralism is "a sociopolitical system in which the power of the
state is shared with a large number of private groups, interest organizations, and
individuals represented by such organizations." Presthus, supra note 280, at 274-80.
286. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 89.
287. DAHL, supra note 230, at 31-40; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 282, 282-90 (1983).
288. See THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 201-02 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969); DAHL,
supra note 230, at 31-54; FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-100; Lowl, supra note 220, at
32-35.
289. See FOLEY, supra note 281, at 87-88.
290. See id. at 94-97; C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
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and, thereby, form a ruling elite. 29' This elitist system undermines a
pluralistic democracy. A pluralistic democracy functions properly only
when all groups of individuals have a powerful voice in the political
arena. 292 Groups consisting of minority and poor individuals do not
have a strong voice today.293 If pluralistic democracy became more
294
inclusive and balanced, many present critics would likely support it.

The formation of diverse groups that can provide a powerful voice
in the political arena depends on a sufficient supply of diverse individuals. As discussed previously, the family plays a significant role in
the production of individuals with diverse interests and opinions.295
Therefore, the family supplies society and the political system with the
raw material--diverse citizens-necessary for the formation of powerful diverse groups. In light of the critiques of democratic pluralism,
families, especially poor and minority families, must raise their children so that they will ultimately form diverse associations. In turn,
these associations will provide a wide array of powerful voices within
the political system.
The second positive role groups provide is insulating their members
from state intrusion. This role is based on a theory of associational
sphere sovereignty.296 Under this theory, a pluralistic society consists
of numerous separate spheres of human association.297 According to
this theory, the state is just one sphere which is not supreme over all
other spheres.298 The state sphere interacts with other associational
spheres on a relatively level playing field. 299 To some degree, each
associational sphere insulates individuals from the activities and rela-

291. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 94-97; MILLS, supra note 290.
292. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 90-91.
293. Id. at 94-97.
294. See THE BIAS OF PLURALISM, supra note 288, at 13-19; DAHL, supra note 230, at
81-107; FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-100; see also Easterbrook, supra note 204
(supporting Madison's constitutional plan and the desirability of factions, but also
discussing various reasons why all of Madison's visions have not come true); cf. Lowi,
supra note 220, at 31-41 (focusing on the effect of modem pluralism on government's
role and authority in society rather than on the inadequacy of group participation and
power for certain populations within society, but expressly recognizing the power of
groups within the current political arena).
295. See supra part V.B.
296. See POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 230, at
1-30; WALZER, supra note 287, at 312-21; Dailey, supra note 169, at 994-1031.
297. Examples of various groups are the family, the state, the church, and the market.
See, e.g., POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 230. See

generally WALZER, supra note 287 (discussing spheres of human association in society).
298. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-92; WALZER, supra note 287, at 281-311.
299. See supra note 298.
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tionships of other spheres.3 °° Thus, the family may serve to insulate
insulate the
the individual from the state, and the state certainly may
3°2
30
individual from the church ' and even from the family.
This theory does not define the degree of insulation among spheres,
but instead, instructs that the degree of insulation depends on the
particular social systems.3 °3 Under the associational sphere sovereignty theory, however, a social system should have some sort of
sphere boundaries. 30 4 These associational sphere boundaries play a
positive role within a social system, because no sphere has a
monopoly on regulating individuals or defining the purpose of life.30 5
Associational spheres substantially affect a social system. For
example, no sphere boundaries exist in the traditional views of
individualism or communalism. The traditional liberal view of individualism places no group relationships between the individual and the
state.30 6 The state becomes the exclusive and supreme human

300. See supra note 298.
301. This most commonly occurs when children enter the public school systems in
the United States. Courts regularly enforce the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment in a way that insulates individual students from the religious sphere while
they attend public schools. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
(invalidating state law which forbad teaching of evolution in public schools unless
accompanied by the teaching of "creation science"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (holding that state law cannot authorize one minute of silence for meditation or
voluntary prayer); School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (finding that state law cannot require that Bible passages be read or prayer be
recited in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (concluding that state
cannot compose and require prayer to be recited in public schools).
302. In cases involving incidents of serious abuse or neglect on the part of a
caretaker, the state acts to insulate the individual child from the family associational
sphere. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (finding that clear and
convincing evidence of parental unfitness required in order to permanently terminate
parental rights, but upholding a state's authority to intervene and protect children
within the family sphere); In re A.M., 530 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (requiring a
state to show a clear necessity before removing children based on substantiated sexual
abuse); In re Y.P., 509 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (allowing state intervention
where a mother was unwilling or unable to protect children from abuse by male friend).
303. See generally WALZER, supra note 287 (arguing for an egalitarian society
composed of several spheres of justice each with its own components and opposing the
domination of any one sphere); Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 DISSENT
45 (1959); Marie A. Failinger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates: A
Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49 U. Prr. L. REV.
143 (1987) (arguing that associational preferences based upon one characteristic will
not promote social diversity).
304. See supra note 303.
305. See generally POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra
note 230, at 257-63 (discussing sphere of sovereignty); WALZER, supra note 287 (same).
306.

FOLEY, supra note 281, at 27-45.
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association. 317 Under communalism, the state is again supreme. 30 8
The only "group" with power is the entire community.3 9 Powerful
intermediate associationsal0 do not exist.31
In a social systemthat lacks powerful groups to mediate between the
individual and the state, the state dictates the terms and defines the
purpose of life.31 2 Since no individual or group truly knows the
33
purpose of life, many people object to such a unitary system. 1
However, a pluralistic social system with powerful intermediate
associations avoids this objectionable result. Intermediate groups
freely define life in diverse ways and pursue diverse goals within the
public political arena.314 This type of social system comports with the
pragmatic
realities and the normative traditions of American plu315
ralism.
The family provides one of the fundamental associational spheres.
In American society, the family sphere plays a role in insulating the
individual from the state.31 6 Naturally, other associational spheres
may serve this same pluralistic function. 1 7 The family sphere,
however, has a profound effect on individuals during childhood which
renders this sphere unique and indispensable. 318 During some of the
most crucial periods of basic human development, children do not play
a truly active, understanding role in any associational sphere except for
within the family.319 Rather, during this time period, a child's only
307. Id.
308. See POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 230, at
1-25.
309. See id.
310. Intermediate associations include those which are either powerful as actors in
the political arena or as insulators between the individual and the state.
311. See POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 230, at
1-25.
312. See id.
313. See POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY, supra note 230, at
1-25; WALZER, supra note 287; Arendt, supra note 303.
3 14. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 87-88.
3 15. See DAHL, supra note 230, at 31-54; DAHL, supra note 280, at 22-24; FOLEY,
supra note 281, at 85-100.
3 16. See generally Dailey, supra note 169.
3 17. For example, churches, schools, business corporations, and labor unions.
318. See FAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 20-39.
3 19. One of the most crucial periods of human development is the period from birth
to age three. During this period of life, the family is the primary, if not exclusive,
associational sphere in which the child participates. See id. at 69-80.
Note that this Article adopts a broad definition of the family which includes all the
adults who have a close affective relationship with a specific child, whether or not the
adults have a biological relationship with the child. See supra note 179.
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social role requires him or her to attach to a primary caretaker or set of
primary caretakers. 3' This attachment process allows children to form
intimate relationships within the family setting which will provide the
pattern for their future relationships and associations with other
individuals.321
The role of the family associational sphere in a pluralist democracy
must be distinguished from the role of the family in the production of
good citizens.322 The family sphere serves a more fundamental role
than to produce good citizens who will form "good" associations that
will directly serve the long-term public interest. In securing the pluralistic system, society does not require the production of only good
associations, but of many associations-both good and bad.323
Pluralistic social and political systems depend only on a sufficient
number of individuals who possess basic associational skills that will
allow others to form numerous associations outside the state sphere.
Within the family sphere in American society, individuals first learn to
relate to other individuals in a setting largely free from state intrusion
and, thereby, learn to develop basic associational skills.324
For groups to act as a collective voice and to insulate individuals
from the state, they must have power. 325 Groups must have enough
power to affect decisions in the political arena and to constrain the state
sphere. The group's power originates from the associational skills of
the individual group members. Individual associational skills result
from an early intimate experience with a group that exists outside the
state sphere.326 The family plays this political role within a large
pluralistic democracy.327 In American society, the family is the primary associational sphere that provides direct and immediate care for
children in a setting insulated from state intrusion.328
The state arguably denies children not raised in a private family
setting the opportunity to develop the basic associational skills necesFAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 67-74.
321. See id. at 20-65; SMrIH & COWIE, supra note 228, at 59-73.
322. See supra part V.A.
323. See generally Arendt, supra note 303 (arguing for protection of the freedom of
association for the purpose of societal diversity); Karst, supra note 235 (arguing that
freedom of association is fundamental to cultural diversity).
324. FAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 22-23; Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note
169, at 479-84.
325. FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-100.
326. See supra note 324.
327. See supra note 324.
328. Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 169, at 476-84; see also MICHAEL

320.

GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICA (1985) (providing a history of the American family).
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sary for the proper functioning of a pluralistic democracy. 329 Foster
care placements deny children this type of private family setting,
because the state plays a major role in foster families.33° Specifically,
the public child welfare agency caseworker becomes a significant
presence in the life of a child placed in foster care. 33 1 The caseworker's presence constantly reminds the child that he or she is under
the control of a state agency, not his or her immediate adult
caretakers.332 In addition, foster children must appear in court frequently.333 At each court appearance, the child directly confronts the
fact that he or she is a "ward of the state. '' 334 An even more profound
example of state control occurs when the state moves a child in foster
care from home to home. 335
The effects of such a childhood environment have significant
ramifications on the development of basic associational skills. 336 A
329. See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-87; Lowi, supra note 220, at 34-35.
330. See supra notes 260, 273 (discussing the states' selection criteria for, and
subsequent regulation of, foster families).
331. In representing numerous children living in foster care, the author has witnessed
the extent of intrusion into family life that a child must endure resulting from the
activities of his or her foster care caseworker. For example, the foster care caseworker
periodically visits children in their foster care home in order to monitor them and their
family; often supervises visits between children and their biological parents and/or
siblings; sometimes imposes school performance conditions (in one case threatening to
remove a child from his foster home if he was disciplined at school); often transports
children to, and monitors progress in, psychiatric counseling; and, in situations
involving transracial placements, often makes sure children are adequately instructed
about his or her cultural background.
332. See supra note 331.
333. The CWA requires an administrative or judicial review hearing every six months
during a child's placement in foster care. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (1994). Most states'
child welfare laws require judicial review hearings at least every six months. See, e.g.,
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6351 (1994). At least one state requires judicial review hearings
every three months. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19(3) (West 1994); Mich.
Ct. R. 5.973(B)(2). These review hearings are often quite burdensome for children,
especially in urban settings where caseloads are extremely high. For example, in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, up to 70 hearings may be scheduled for 9:30 a.m.
Although many of these cases may not require a hearing due to the agreement of the
parties, it is often 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. before a case is called. During this long wait,
children must not only spend time in crowded, filthy court hallways, but also must
interact with biological parents, caseworkers, attorneys, community service providers,
and court personnel. These interactions are often extremely uncomfortable, strained,
and upsetting for the children. Children often come away from these experiences
resigned to the idea that their living situations are completely out of their control.
334. See supra note 333.
335. This fact is not hidden from children living in foster care. In representing
children in Michigan and Pennsylvania, the author has regularly witnessed children who
have been instructed to bring all of their belongings to court because they may be going
to a new home following the court hearing.
336. See the empirical research studies discussed in Herring, supra note 28, at 144-
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significant percentage of children placed in foster care fails to develop
the ability to form trusting relationships with others and tends to
withdraw from social participation with others.3 37 These associational
outcomes exist in contrast to the outcomes for children who grow up
in private family settings that remain free from state intrusion.33 Even
in abusive family settings, children often form strong attachments to
their primary caretakers, 339 and arguably develop some basic associational skills.
The foster care setting and its outcomes pose a problem from the
perspective of political theory and philosophy in a pluralistic democracy.3' 4 Arguably, a large, pluralistic democracy may be significantly
50; Musewicz, supra note 45, at 637-47; Wald, supra note 23, at 670-72. The extent to
which children are harmed by foster care placements is debatable. See, e.g., Garrsion,
Child Welfare Decisionmaking,supra note 23, at 1777-87. Even the empirical studies
cited by Professor Garrison indicate a higher rate of social dysfunction for adults who
experienced foster care placements as children when compared with the general adult
population. Id.
337. See supra note 336.
338. See supra note 336.
339. See generally FAHLBERG, supra note 71, at 141-74 (describing the trauma
suffered by children who are removed from their families); WALD ET AL., supra note 60, at
10-12, 136-44 (explaining attachment theory and the relationships between children
and their primary caretakers); Patricia M. Crittendon, Children's Strategies for Coping
with Adverse Home Environments: An Interpretation Using Attachment Theory, 16
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 329, 339 (1992) (discussing the relationships between abused
children and their families).
In representing children in civil child protection proceedings, the author regularly
observes the strength of attachment between a child and an abusive parent. Children
living in these abusive situations regularly have a fervent goal to remain in the parental
home or to return to the parental home as soon as possible. This strong attachment may
be the result of the relatively high level of functioning of abusive parents and the
positive prognosis for these parents. See Patricia M. Crittendon, Family and Dyadic
Patternsof Functioning in Maltreating Families,in EARLY PREDICTION AND PREVENTION
OF CHILD ABUSE 161 (Bowne et al. eds., 1988). In contrast, the author regularly
observes children being removed from foster homes without any objection to the
removal. They generally appear to be resigned to their situation and unwilling to fight,
or even express a desire to remain in their foster homes.
340. The foster care setting and its outcomes are also problematic from the
perspective of constitutional legal doctrine. First, denying children placed in foster care
a full opportunity to develop basic associational skills arguably violates their right to
equal protection under the law. Even if these children do not constitute a suspect class,
and even if the opportunity to develop basic associational skills is deemed not to
constitute a fundamental right, it could be argued that there is no rational basis for
keeping children in long-term foster care placements when permanent homes outside the
foster care system are available. Second, denying children the opportunity to develop
basic associational skills may violate their substantive right to freedom of association.
As noted above, these arguments asserting a child's constitutional right to a permanent
family home have been rejected by the courts. A full analysis of these possible
constitutional claims is beyond the scope of this Article; however, for examples of
some constitutional arguments, see the sources cited in note 152, supra.
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harmed if a substantial number of children are raised in foster homes
under state control. The state constitutes a very powerful associational
sphere. In order to constrain this powerful state sphere, individual
citizens must have the ability to form diverse and powerful groups
separate from the state. By raising children in the public foster care
system, society theoretically jeopardizes its ability to produce sufficient
numbers of diverse citizens who possess the basic associational skills
that allow them to form the powerful private groups necessary for the
proper functioning of a large pluralistic democracy.
The family's political role in securing the proper functioning of
democratic pluralism provides strong theoretical and philosophical
justifications for the major components of permanency planning concepts. Both the high barriers to state intervention in the biological
family before removal of children from parental custody, as well as the
achievement of timely permanent private family placements following
removal, conform to this political role for the family. These major
principles of permanency planning sustain the child's development of
basic associational skills through continuous and intimate experiences
with specific adults in a setting insulated from pervasive state control.
However, this justification for implementing permanency planning
concepts faces the same problem identified in exploring a justification
based on the political role of the family in controlling majority factions.
The pragmatic, real-world effect of the current foster care system on
the American political system appears insignificant. A significant percentage of children raised in foster care develop the skills necessary to
form associations outside the state sphere, with many children exiting
long-term foster care as fully functioning adult citizens.3 4' Although
relatively more children raised in foster care settings may fail to
develop basic associational skills,3 42 arguably a sufficient number of
children raised in foster care will successfully develop basic associational skills. 343 Thus, long-term foster care placements pose no actual
threat to the pluralistic political system.
Again, the pragmatic effect may be more substantial for groups that
depend on a sufficient number of individual citizens who identify with
minority communities. A much greater percentage of individuals from
341. See Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking, supra note 23, at 1777-86.
Again, it should be noted that the extent to which children emerge from foster care as
fully functioning adults is debatable. See Herring, supra note 28, at 144-50.
Nevertheless, even the empirical studies cited in this Article indicate that a significant
percentage of adults who had experienced foster care placements as children function as
fully competent adults. Id.
342. See supra note 336.
343. See supra note 341.
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these populations are affected by the public child welfare system.34
The failure of individuals from minority populations to develop basic
associational skills significantly affects groups dependent on individuals from these populations.3 45 According to critics of the current
functioning of democratic pluralism in America, minority groups need
more strength to secure the proper functioning of the American
political system. 46 Thus, American society cannot afford to reduce
the number of individuals with basic associational skills who may
become members of these targeted groups. 347 But even within the
most targeted populations, the percentage of children who experience
public child welfare interventions remains lOW. 348 This fact leads to
the conclusion that long-term foster care placements do not significantly hinder any specific type of association or actually harm the
pluralistic American political system.
Therefore, on a philosophical and theoretical level, the political role
of the family in securing the proper functioning of a pluralistic democracy strongly justifies implementing permanency planning concepts.
But even acknowledging the more extensive effect of public child
welfare interventions on groups made up of members of minority
communities, the minimal pragmatic effect of long-term foster care
placements significantly weakens this justification for implementing
permanency planning concepts.
Two of the three political roles of the family discussed to this
point-the family's role in producing socially diverse citizens 349 and
the family's impact on group and association theories350-are not
mutually exclusive. The production of diverse associations, and thus
diverse factions, depends not only on citizens with diverse reasoning
and faculties, but also on diverse citizens who possess basic
associational skills. Developing a broad array of powerful associations depends on producing citizens who not only possess basic
associational skills, but diverse reasoning and faculties. In a sense,
these two political roles for the family, which arise from different
veins of political theory and philosophy, merge. The family serves
political roles in supporting the production of both "associational
344.
345.
system
346.
347.
16-26;
348.
349.
350.

See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
Empirical evidence of this effect can be found in charges that the child welfare
causes cultural genocide. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
See THE BIAS OF PLURALISM, supra note 288, at 13-19; DAHL, supra note 230, at
FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-100; Presthus, supra note 280, at 285-291.
See supra note 270.
See supra part V.B.
See supra part V.C.
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diversity" and "associational power." The large American democratic
republic values associational diversity and associational power,
because both attributes assist in controlling factious behavior35 ' and in
securing the proper functioning of a pluralistic democracy." 2
D. The Family and Tolerancefor Associational
Diversity and Power
Examination of a line of United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning the substantive right to privacy identifies the final political
role of the family discussed in this Article. 3 Many of these decisions
address situations within a family setting, and at times appear to be
based on principles of family autonomy, while at other times appear to
be based on the rights of individuals.354 Consequently, several
commentators question the source of privacy rights.3
In questioning the source of these rights, commentators criticize the
Court for creating confusion as to whether these rights are individually
or family-based. 356 In particular, commentators note that family-based
privacy rights have historically resulted in a substantial loss of
individual rights, especially for women and children.357 In any event,
it is least plausible that the Court chose the family setting to identify
and define a substantive right to privacy simply because it was more
comfortable explaining this right in the traditional family setting.358
This possibility raises additional questions: Why was the Court
more comfortable defining individual privacy rights within a family
setting? Why did the Court choose the family setting, rather than
settings involving only isolated individuals, to initially define the
351. See EPSTEIN, supra note 189, at 88-93.
352. DAHL, supra note 230, at 81-85; FOLEY, supra note 281, at 85-100.
353. See supra note 239 for a discussion of this line of cases. This Article has
avoided the traditional term of a "zone of privacy" in order to avoid the confusing
conflict between individual rights and familial rights. See supra note 241. Now, as this
Article discusses legal doctrine, it uses the more traditional term.
354. See Dailey, supra note 169, at 1008-31; Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in
Transition from Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1535-58
(1994); Eichbaum, supra note 169, at 372-81; Karst, supra note 235, at 652-92.
355. See supra note 354.
356. See Dailey, supra note 169, at 1018-27; Minow, supra note 170, at 840-51;
Woodhouse, supra note 173, at 1036-68.
357. See supra note 356.
358. The confusion concerning the locus of privacy rights may be due to the failure
of the Court to articulate the political roles of the family in American society. If the
Court had fully explored and articulated the political roles for the family in reaching its
privacy decisions, this confusion would have been significantly reduced. See Dailey,
supra note 169, at 962-81.
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degree of governmental self-restraint required by a substantive
constitutional right to privacy? Specifically, why do courts tolerate
extreme situations-family settings in which adult caretakers provide
only minimally adequate care for children?35 9 In addition, why are the
boundaries between the family and the state defined and enforced
primarily in the judicial forum, as opposed to more political or democratic forums?
These fundamental questions mirror the questions in Dean
Bollinger's theory of tolerance towards free speech. 360 Although not
addressed by Dean Bollinger, this theory applies to the right of
association, and can be extended to form the basis for an additional
justification for permanency planning.
1. Bollinger's Theory of Tolerance and Free Speech
Dean Bollinger constructed a unique social principle, or public role,
for free speech protections. 6 ' Bollinger asserted that free speech
protections secure not only speech, but also stand as a vivid example
359. The courts regularly place children in family settings in which the caretakers
have marginal parenting skills or capacities. This has become even more common with
the increased availability and use of in-home services designed to aggressively preserve
intact families or to reunify families that are experiencing parenting problems. In one
case, the author represented the child welfare agency that was seeking to terminate
parental rights for a three-year-old child who had failed to thrive due to neglect while
living with his biological parents and his seven siblings. The judge asked one question
that proved to be pivotal: if the child was now old enough and strong enough to fight
with his siblings for food. The experts responded that the child was now physically able
to fight for food. In deciding to deny the child welfare agency's request for termination
of parental rights, the judge immediately placed the child back in the home of the
biological family after he had lived for over two years in the care of his foster parents.
Although not quite as dramatic as this case, because the courts did not return children to
their biological parents immediately upon denying an agency request to terminate
parental rights, courts in many other cases have required children to go through intense
reunification efforts with their biological parents who possess marginal parenting
skills, even after the children have received lengthy placements in foster care. See, e.g.,
In re Jones, 436 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387
(N.H. 1978), disavowed by In re Tricia & Trixie H., 493 A.2d 1146 (N.H. 1985); In re
Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139 (N.Y. 1984); In re La Freniere, 420 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1980);
Harris v. Lynchberg Div. of Social Servs., 288 S.E.2d 410 (Va. 1982). Cases like these
make it clear that courts are willing to tolerate extreme parenting situations that merely
provide minimally adequate care for children and do not attempt to secure the best
possible parenting situations for children.
3 60. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
Following his critique of what he terms the "classical
model" and the "fortress model" of protection for free, sometimes extreme, speech,
Bollinger concludes that these models are inadequate. Id. at 43-103. According to
Bollinger, these models are inadequate because they focus on the value of speech itself to
provide justifications for protecting speech activity. Id.
361. Id.
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of American society's broad commitment to tolerance.362 To support
his argument, Bollinger detailed the strong human impulse for
intolerance of others' thoughts. 363 This impulse of intolerance, if left
unrestrained, could result in both excessive governmental and social
sanctions. 3' 4 Dean Bollinger argued that the exercise of extensive
governmental restraint in the discrete area of speech activity tempers
the impulse of excessive intolerance in all areas of human activity.365
He added that American society singled out speech as a special area of
human activity with an extremely high degree of protection.366
Bollinger asserted that society created this area of protection to
promote the tolerant intellectual character necessary in a large
democracy.367
After setting forth his broad social theory of free speech protection,
Dean Bollinger examined how this theory assists in understanding the
issues of a free speech theory:
[I]n understanding the three fundamental issues that have so
bedeviled the development of a viable free speech theory for
modem times: Why should we exercise such extraordinary selfrestraint in the regulation of speech when we do not with respect
to nonspeech behavior? Why, in particular, should we tolerate
extremist speech? Why should we vest the interpretative and
368
enforcement functions of the principle in the judicial branch?
Bollinger's theory provides insightful answers to these fundamental
questions. According to Bollinger, the protection of speech, even
362. Id. at 107.
363. Id. at 109-10. According to Bollinger, thoughts may be revealed through
speech and behavior. Id. at 110-11.
364. Id. at 113-14. Such governmental and social sanctions include long-term
imprisonment, social ostracism, and violent attacks. Id.
365. According to Bollinger:
At this stage, however, it would be better if we described the purpose behind
the principle not as that of protecting speech but rather as that of dealing with
the phenomenon of what we have called the "impulse to excessive
intolerance" generally, though we do that by insisting on an extraordinary
degree of toleration only in the limited context of speech activity. The role of
free speech is directed at developing a capacity of far greater moment than that
of just regulating the appropriate level of legal restraints on speech activity in
the society. The legal principle operates in a small sphere, and in a special
way, in order to address a larger issue. Law (in this case, constitutionallaw) is
being used not simply as a barrier against entry but as a major project
concerned with nothing less than helping to shape the intellectual character of
the society.
Id. at 107 (alteration in original).
366. See id. at 12-15.
367. Id. at 117-18.
368. Id. at 107.
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extremist speech which may incite strong reactions of intolerance,
vividly demonstrates society's commitment to tolerance in all areas of
human activity.3 69 This tolerance helps develop the necessary intellectual character of society in a large pluralistic democracy. 370 The
judiciary must protect this demonstration of tolerance from majoritarian
forces inspired by intolerance, and provide a coherent explanation for
" '
toleration.37
Dean Bollinger specifically addresses free speech protections under
the First Amendment. However, his theory applies to the other areas
protected under the First Amendment.372
2. Bollinger's Theory Applied to the Right of Association
Bollinger's theory also applies to the right of association protected
by the First Amendment. The major difference between speech
activity and associational activity3 73 is the breadth of activities encompassed within these areas of human endeavor. As Bollinger pointed
out, speech activity is a limited sphere of verbal behavior that can be
fairly well defined.37 4 Therefore, according to Bollinger, free speech
can stand as a discrete area of protection that demonstrates social
tolerance.375 Associational activity involves a much broader sphere of
activity, encompassing both verbal and non-verbal behavior.376 Therefore, the government cannot construct barriers protecting all
associational activities to the same degree as speech protection.
The Constitution allows detailed regulation of many associational
activities such as corporate activities, labor union activities, school
369. See id. at 104-44.
370. Id. at 117-18.
371. Id. at 135-37 (explaining the importance of protecting these views and why the
judiciary must protect such tolerance). Bollinger cited the example of the Nazis' wish to
march in Skokie, Illinois. Id. at 125-31.
372. For example, the Bollinger theory could apply to the free exercise of religion
and the right of association. It should be noted that the free exercise of religion often
involves the right of association. Religious activity is often associational activity
with a specific empowering force or purpose. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 114
(1989); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 431-33 (1987).
373. Associational activity refers to both the formation of associations and the
subsequent actions of associations.
374. See BOLLINGER, supra note 360, at 119-24.
375. Id. at 124.
376. There are many types of associations within American society other than the
family or religious organizations. Associations include corporations, labor unions,
schools, neighborhood groups, clubs, and-organized crime. These associations within
American society engage in a wide array of both verbal and non-verbal behavior.
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activities, and organized crime activities.377 Nonetheless, associational
activities face the same phenomenon of social intolerance that Bollinger
details in developing his theory for free speech protection.378 Associational activities face intolerance from both society in general and
majoritarian forces of the state. 379 The powerful human feelings that
lead to intolerance of others' views 380 constitute an especially powerful
force when focused on associational activities. 38' These feelings most
likely result from a general perception that associational activity, as
opposed to activity by isolated individuals, poses a greater threat to
society.382 Thus, associational activities may face a serious threat from
the forces of intolerance. This threat may be greater than that faced by
speech activity.
Despite these natural feelings of intolerance for associational
activity, First Amendment doctrine evidences society's view that
383
American society should value and protect associational activity.
Applying Bollinger's theory to the right of association, the state should
strongly protect specific associational spheres from governmental
377. This is evidenced by the inability of these types of associational groups to
exclude persons as members. Professor Failinger labeled these groups as "middlespectrum associations"-associations which fall between private, intimate associations
such as family and public, political associations. The courts protect these middlespectrum associations in social and economic settings to a much lesser degree from state
intrusion and regulation. Failinger, supra note 303, at 149; see also Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (applying California's Unruh Civil Rights Act to
local Rotary Clubs by requiring clubs to admit women does not violate the First
Amendment and does not interfere unduly with club members' freedom of association);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (applying the Minnesota Human
Rights Act to the Jaycees to bar discrimination in places of public accommodation did
not abridge male members' freedom of association).
378. See BOLLINGER, supra note 360, at 93.
379. The powerful force of intolerance for associational activities has been evident
throughout history. The repression of communist party activities in the McCarthy era,
and the recent attacks on hate group activities, provide vivid examples of this human
impulse for intolerance. See, e.g., MORRIS DEES & STEVE FIFFER, A SEASON FOR JUSTICE:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER MORRIS DEES (1991) (describing the tactic of
using civil lawsuits to bankrupt the Ku Klux Klan); M.J. HEALE, AMERICAN
ANTICOMMUNISM: COMBATING THE ENEMY WITHIN 1830-1970 167, 167-90 (1990); JOEL
KOVEL, RED HUNTING INTHE PROMISED LAND 109, 109-36 (1994).
380. Views can be evidenced through speech and non-speech activities. See
BOLLINGER, supra note 360, at 124.
381. See supra note 379.
382. This perception is evidenced by the fact that criminal activity involving a
conspiracy is punished more harshly than criminal activity involving a single
perpetrator. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); United States v.
Inafuku, 938 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 877 (1992); Paul Marcus,
Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More
Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (1992).
383. See Failinger, supra note 303, at 146-47.
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intrusion. This would demonstrate society's commitment to associational diversity and develop the tolerant intellectual character which
secures the proper functioning of a large democracy.384 Both the
religious and family associational spheres offer the opportunity to
make such a vivid demonstration of societal commitment to tolerance.
Religious associations have a long history of societal and constitutional
protection in America.385 In all their forms, religious associations
allow for a clear demonstration of society's commitment to associational diversity and power.
The First Amendment does not expressly protect the family sphere,
as it does the religious sphere.386 Nevertheless, the family has been a
fundamental form of association since the beginning of American
society. 387 Although the relationships between family members have
changed over time, the family-broadly defined 388-has consistently
provided the initial associational sphere for individuals. 389 By insulating this associational sphere from a large degree of state intrusion,
society can clearly demonstrate tolerance for diverse associational
spheres which exist separate from the state.
The opportunity for society to demonstrate associational tolerance
provides an additional political role for the family. The family sphere,
insulated to a significant degree from state intrusion, demonstrates
society's tolerance for associational diversity and power. Most individuals will intimately relate to this demonstration based on their own
family experiences.

384. See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 360, at 117-18 (explaining the importance
of applying Bollinger's theory to protect the ideals of democracy).
385. See Gedicks, supra note 372, at 122-37. Although generally arguing that
Supreme Court decisions involving First Amendment rights of associational freedom
and free exercise of religion have not offered religious groups sufficient constitutional
shelter to cover their interests in self-definition, Professor Gedicks examines the
relevant Supreme Court decisions and concludes that "whenever government action so
severely pressures a religious group's concept of itself that its very existence is
threatened, the First Amendment generally commands that the government, not the
group, be the one that yields, even if the resulting anti-social consequences are not
narrowly confined ... ." Id. at 136. Professor Gedicks discovers this area of church
autonomy in Supreme Court decisions. See id. at 129-37; see, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
386. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
387. See JOHN DEMOS, A LITrLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE iN PLYMOUTH COLONY
62 (1970); GROSSBERG, supra note 328, at 5-6; Minow, supra note 170, at 865; Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135 (1985).
388. For the broad definition of "family" utilized in this Article, see supra note 179.
389. See supra note 387.
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This political role of the family answers the questions raised
concerning the courts' treatment of the right to privacy. First, the Supreme Court may have chosen the family setting initially to detail
governmental self-restraint required by a constitutional right to
privacy. This path not only defines individual rights, but also demonstrates society's commitment to associational diversity.3 90 From this
perspective, the Court protects the family association from excessive
state intrusion, at least in part, to demonstrate tolerance for diverse
associations outside the state sphere. As in the free speech area, such
demonstrations help develop a proper societal intellectual character.
Specifically, courts may tolerate extreme family situations39' to
demonstrate a commitment to associational diversity. The language of
state child welfare statutes often permits courts to "rescue" children
from poverty, an "immoral" environment, or even a moderate degree
of neglect or abuse.392 However, the courts regularly refuse to apply
the statutes in this broad manner.393 Judicial restraint in these extreme
390. See Failinger, supra note 303, at 149-52 (discussing, for example, the
"diversity producing" justification for the protection of associations expressly
recognized by Justice Brennan in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 610 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) and in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625
(1984)). Although the cases discussed by Professor Failinger do not address the family
association specifically, they do indicate the Court's concerns with protecting
associational diversity. See Dailey, supra note 169, at 979 (explaining how the family
unit defines the core interest in protecting diverse affiliations).
391. An "extreme situation" would include minimal state intrusion into families in
which parents provide minimally adequate care for children.
392. Most state laws which would allow intervention define child maltreatment too
broadly. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 23, at 628-29; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302
(West 1994) (defining a "dependent" child as "a child who is without proper parental care
or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary
for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals ....
"). In addition, the
legislative intent is ambiguous, because these laws usually expressly define their overall
purpose as preserving the unity of the family and separating parents and child only when
necessary. See, e.g., id. § 6301, stating that the Juvenile Act is to be:
[I]nterpreted and construed as to effectuate the following purposes: (1) to
preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to provide for the care,
protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children
coming within the provisions of the chapter ....
(3) To achieve the foregoing
purposes in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child
from parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public
safety.
Id.
393. The author has regularly witnessed the courts applying such statutes to preclude
state intervention in families in the form of removal of children from parental custody,
based solely on evidence of family poverty (even in situations of homelessness),
homosexual relationships within the household, an infant's exposure to drugs in utero,
or even significant unsanitary conditions in the home. This result has become more
prevalent with the significant growth of in-home services designed to provide short-

250

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

situations vividly demonstrates the tolerance for associational diversity
that society can utilize in situations well beyond the family setting.394
Further, such restraint demonstrates the importance of diverse associations relatively free from state intrusion in a large pluralistic
democracy.395
Finally, as opposed to more democratic forums, the judicial forum
may be the most appropriate forum to define and enforce the boundaries between the family sphere and the state sphere.396 Bollinger's

foundation rests on the general human intolerance for different ideas,
opinions, and associations.3 97 The courts, the non-majoritarian
decision-makers in the American political system, can most fully
exercise and explain the degree of governmental restraint necessary for
an anti-majoritarian demonstration of society's commitment to associational diversity.3 98
3. Tolerance of Associational Diversity as a Justification
for Permanency Planning
This political role for the family provides a significant and pragmatic
justification for implementing permanency planning concepts. Cases
in the child welfare system involve parents who allegedly cannot provide minimally adequate care for a child within the current family
setting.3 99 These cases, which often receive public attention,' ° provide rich opportunities for society to demonstrate its commitment to
diverse family settings and, more broadly, diverse associations insulated from extensive state intrusion.
implementing permanency planning concepts would allow this
demonstration to occur. Most directly, permanency planning concepts
term assistance to a family in order to avoid removal. In the author's experience, the
courts generally take the goal of family unity seriously and do not permit the state to
remove children from parental custody when they are receiving minimally adequate care,
or give up on parents who cannot provide minimally adequate care. See, e.g., In re
Haynes, 473 A.2d 1365 (Pa. 1983); In re Ryan Michael C., 440 A.2d 535 (Pa. 1982); In
re Jackson, 406 A.2d 1116 (Pa. 1979).
394. See BOLLINGER, supra note 360, at 135.
395. See generally id. at 133-37 (explaining the importance of using the judiciary to
protect speech and tolerance).
396. See id.
397. See id. at 104-44.
398. See id. at 133-37.
399. See supra note 392 discussing standards of adequate care.
400. See, e.g., Celia W. Dugger, Escaping Abuse But Not Neglect: Children
Languish in Foster Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1994, at Al; Celia W. Dugger, Foster
Child From Birth: Torn Between Two Families, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1994, at Al; see
also infra part V.D.4.
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construct a hurdle to state intrusion into the family sphere. 40 1 If
caseworkers believe state intervention is necessary, they may provide
only those services specifically aimed at assisting the family to avoid
removal of the child.4 °2 Caseworkers may remove a child from the
family setting only as a last resort. Further, removal may occur only
when the provision of services specifically aimed at the identified
parenting problems cannot reduce the risk of harm to the child to a
minimally acceptable level. 4 3 Once removal occurs, caseworkers and
legal decision-makers must find a permanent placement for the child in
a timely manner. 4° 4 The permanent placement should not include the
public foster care system and should attempt to place the child within
the original 4 5 family setting. 4°6
Despite the understandable human intolerance of marginal parenting
and the impulse to secure the best possible result for each child, the
state cannot dictate parenting practices designed to achieve a child's
"best interests." The state also should not provide long-term care for
children within a system permeated by state regulations and policies.'
Permanency planning's preference for a biological parent's home as
the child's permanent placement demonstrates society's strong commitment to associational diversity. 4 8 Maintaining this original random
assignment of children to their biological parents, even in the face of
minimally adequate caretaking conditions, demonstrates a deep societal
commitment to the associational diversity and power which helps
secure the proper functioning of a large pluralistic democracy.
4. A Case Study
In the child welfare setting, a commitment to associational diversity
regularly exposes children to a risk of harm which often could be
reduced through additional state intervention.4 9 This calculated exposure to risk demonstrates society's willingness to sacrifice some
degree of child safety and well-being to secure associational diversity
and power. Often, these demonstrations capture the attention of the
public.41 °
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See supra part III.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Id.
Id. § 675(1).
The original family is usually the biological family.
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See supra note 260 for a discussion of state regulation of the foster care system.
See supra notes 386-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 400.
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A recent case in the Pittsburgh area provides an example of this type
of demonstration. 41 The case involved an African-American boy
named Byron. 41 2 The public child welfare agency removed Byron
from his mother's custody almost immediately following his birth.413
Byron's mother was a single, African-American woman.414 His father
was deceased.4 5
Caseworkers removed Byron from his mother's custody because of
her use of cocaine during pregnancy, her history of substance abuse,
and her failure to provide adequate care for Byron's siblings.41 6 A
juvenile court judge found Byron "dependent" pursuant to the Penn411. See infra notes 412-42 and accompanying text. There are also many other cases
that receive public attention. See, e.g., Megan O'Matz, Abuse Spotlights Trouble in
Foster Care, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1992, at Al; Megan O'Matz, Sometimes
Going Home Means More Abuse, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 1992, at Al; Megan
O'Matz, System's Problems Overwhelm Caseworkers, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 7,
1992, at Al; see also supra note 400.
412. See Jan Ackerman, InterracialCustody Case Heard,PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
June 24, 1993, at C1 [hereinafter Ackerman, June 24, 1993]; Jan Ackerman, White Pair
Keep Black Foster Child Six Months, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 1993, at Al
[hereinafter Ackerman, June 26, 1993]; Baby Byron: More is Involved Than Whether
Whites Can Raise Blacks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 23., 1993, at B2; John G.
Craig, Jr., Blood Ties: The Sanctity and Privacy of Family Life Are Primary,PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1994, at B3; Foster Decision Stands, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Aug. 11, 1993, at B4; R. Lamont Jones, Jr., No Visits by Derzacks, Byron's Great Aunt
Says, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 30, 1993, at Bi; Johnna A. Pro & Barbara W.
Stack, Tot Going Back to Mom: Judge Refuses to Permit White Couple to Adopt Black
Foster Child, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Pro & Stack,
Dec. 21, 1993]; Douglas Root, The Battle Over Baby Byron, PITTSBURGH MAG., Sept.,
1994, at 44; Matthew P. Smith, Authorities Take Baby Byron: Taken From Foster
ParentsAfter Signs They Might Delay His Return to Mother, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Dec. 28, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Smith, Dec. 28, 1993]; Matthew P. Smith, Baby
Byron Back with Natural Family: Biological Mother, Brothers Greet Boy in Drug
Treatment House, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 29, 1993, at B I [hereinafter Smith;
Dec. 29, 1993]; Matthew P. Smith, Judge to Decide Black Baby's Future April 21,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 13, 1993, at BI [hereinafter Smith, Mar. 13, 1993];
Barbara W. Stack, An Olive Branch: Jeffrey Thanks the Derzacks for Caringfor Her
Baby, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 23, 1993, at BI [hereinafter Stack, Dec. 23,
1993]; Barbara W. Stack, Infant's Future Debated Before the Court, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Dec. 16, 1993, at B4 [hereinafter Stack, Dec. 16, 1993].
413. See Smith, Mar. 13, 1993, supra note 412, at B1; Barbara W. Stack, Baby
Byron Goes Back to Derzacks, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 7, 1994, at A14
[hereinafter Stack, Oct. 7, 1994].
414. See Ackerman, June 24, 1993, supra note 412, at Cl; Pro & Stack, Dec. 21,
1993, supra note 412, at Al; Barbara W. Stack, Derzacks Express Hurt, Foster Parents
Question System, Birth Mother's Worthiness, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 22,
1993, at BI [hereinafter Stack, Dec. 22, 1993].
415. See Pro & Stack, Dec. 21, 1993, supra note 412, at Al.
416. Byron's siblings lived with various relatives.
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sylvania Juvenile Act, 417 and placed him in foster care.4 1 8 The foster
family consisted of a married couple, their biological child, and their
two adoptive children. 419 They lived in an upper-middle-class suburb
of Pittsburgh, 420 and were both Caucasian. 42' The foster father was
self-employed.422
When Byron had lived with his foster family for almost six months,
the child welfare agency sought to move Byron to a different foster
home based on the agency's "race-matching" policy. 423 The foster
family opposed the move, retained an attorney, and intervened in the
juvenile court process.424 In response, the juvenile court judge entered
an order precluding the child welfare agency from moving Byron.425
At this point, the media began detailed coverage of the case, with the
initial focus on the agency's race-matching policy. 426 All of the actors
in the case were described in the media. The clear message was that
the white foster family was totally committed to Byron and was able to
provide an extremely nurturing home environment. 427 The press
painted the biological mother as a rather hopeless drug abuser who
could not provide the level of care for Byron that the foster family
could provide.428 In this initial press coverage there was no detailed
417. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6351 (West 1994).
418. See Ackerman, June 26, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Smith, Mar. 13, 1993,
supra note 412, at B1.
419. See Ackerman, June 26, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Root, supra note 412, at
45, 49.
420. See supra note 419.
421. See supra note 419.
422. See Smith, Dec. 29, 1993, supra note 412, at BI.
423. See Stack, Dec. 22, 1993, supra note 414, at Bl; Barbara W. Stack, White
Foster Parent Says Policy is Formula for Heartbreak, PrITSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 6,
1994, at Al [hereinafter Stack, Feb. 6, 1994] (discussing child welfare agency's policy
of moving African-American children from white foster homes just prior to the date
when the children will have spent six months in the particular foster home). After a
child has been in a foster home for six months, Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare regulations give foster parents standing to protest a child's move from their
home. See 55 PA. CODE § 3700.73 (1994); Barbara W. Stack, CYS Alters Foster
Policies: Children Now Won't Be Moved Because of Race, Rules Say, PrTSBURGH POSTGAZETE, June 8, 1994, at C5 [hereinafter Stack, June 8, 1994].
424. See Ackerman, June 26, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Root, supra note 412, at
45; Smith, March 13, 1993, supra note 412, at B1.
425. See Ackerman, June 26, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Smith, March 13, 1993,
supra note 412, at Bl; Barbara W. Stack, Foster Parents File Byron Complaint,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZET-rE, Feb. 18, 1994, at C4 [hereinafter Stack, Feb. 18, 1994].
426. See supra note 412.
427. See generally Ackerman, June 24, 1993, supra note 412, at Cl; Ackerman, June
26, 1993, supra note 412, at AI; Smith, Mar. 13, 1993, supra note 412, at B11; Stack,
Feb. 6, 1994, supra note 423, at Al.
428. See supra note 427.
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exploration of the ability of either the biological mother or of the extended biological family to provide minimally adequate care for
Byron.429 In response to this initial media coverage, the letters to the
editor of the local newspaper were overwhelmingly in favor of the
foster parents' efforts to maintain custody of Byron. 3 °
The child welfare agency responded to the court's denial of its
request for a change in placement in a very unexpected manner.
Although the local system generally did not implement permanency
planning concepts vigorously, in this case the agency worked with the
mother. They quickly enrolled her in a residential drug treatment
program that would allow her to regain custody of two of her children
while she underwent treatment. 431 The mother responded positively to
treatment and sought custody of Byron in several court hearings over
the following year.432 The media continued to cover the case closely,
and a very public debate ensued concerning the appropriate permanent
placement for Byron.433 The foster parents wanted to adopt Byron,434
even though Byron's biological mother wanted custody.435 The
majority of writers still favored adoption by the foster parents, largely
due to their ability to provide better care for Byron.436 Because the
429. See supra note 427.
430. See Letters to Editor, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1993, at B2; Letters to
Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 6, 1993, at B2; Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, July 11, 1993, at B2; Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July
13, 1993, at B2; Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1993, at B2;
Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 1993, at B2.
431. Stack, June 8, 1994, supra note 423, at C5. The child welfare agency's
provision of intensive reunification services is extremely unusual in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania. This is evidenced by the fact that the foster family has initiated a federal
civil rights lawsuit against the child welfare agency which includes a claim that the
agency and other community support service providers conspired to provide the
biological mother with too many services. These excessive services allegedly were
provided only because the biological mother was African-American and the foster
parents were white, allowing the biological mother to regain custody of Byron. Id. The
foster parents contend that this violated federal law. See id.
432. See Pro & Stack, Dec. 21, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Smith, Dec. 28, 1993,
supra note 412, at Al; Stack, Dec. 16, 1993, supra note 412, at B4.
433. See, e.g., Letters to the Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1994, at B3;
Letters to the Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1994, at B3; Letters to the
Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1994, at D2.
434. See Barbara W. Stack, Judge Orders Derzacks Out of Baby Byron Case,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 16, 1994, at B1 [hereinafter Stack, June 16, 1994].
435. See Ackerman, June 24, 1993, supra note 412, at Cl.
436. See Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1994, at B3 (including
three letters in support of the biological mother, and three letters in support of the foster
parents); Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1994, at B3 (including one
letter in support of the biological mother, and five letters in support of the foster
parents); Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1994, at D2 (including
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biological mother made progress in drug treatment, however, some
wrote letters to the editor arguing that she should have custody.437
When Byron was seventeen months old, the juvenile court judge
entered an order placing him in the custody of his biological mother.438
Many members of the public believed that this result demonstrated the
complete failure of the public child welfare system. 439 This result
revealed a partial failure of the system because it took far too long for
the child welfare agency and the court to implement permanency
planning concepts. 440 However, Byron's case provided a very public
and pragmatic demonstration of society's commitment to family diversity, and, more broadly, to associational diversity and power. This
case clearly demonstrated governmental restraint and tolerance in
allowing a single, formerly drug using African-American woman to
regain custody of her biological child despite a very real and present
opportunity to provide that child with a "better" family environment.
Despite the majoritarian human impulse for intolerance of the biological mother's family setting, the state provided a vivid demonstration
of tolerance for associational diversity and power. 441
four letters in support of the foster parents).
437. See supra note 436.
438. See Stack, Oct. 7, 1994, supra note 413, at A14.
439. See Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1994, at D2 (two
letters expressly questioning the child welfare system); Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1994, at B3 (including four letters expressly questioning the child
welfare system); Letters to Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1994, at B3
(including two letters expressly questioning the child welfare system).
440. From a developmental perspective, Byron, an infant at the time of removal from
parental custody, should have been placed in a permanent home within 6 to 12 months.
See Wald, supra note 23, at 690-91. This was the position articulated by Byron's
biological family and several African-American advocacy groups. See Ackerman, June
26, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Ackerman, June 24, 1993, supra note 412, at CI; Pro
& Stack, Dec. 21, 1993, supra note 412, at Al; Smith, March 13, 1993, supra note 412,
at B1. This excessive length of time needed to determine the appropriate permanent
placement for a child involved in a highly publicized case indicates the extremely
lengthy periods of time most children spend in the limbo of temporary foster care
placements. For example, a recent study in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania revealed
that 44% of the children living in temporary foster care placements had been in care for
more than two years. See PERMANENCY PLANNING TASK FORCE COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL
ADVOCATES SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 50, at 3.
441. The public debate concerning this case continues. During the summer of 1994,
the biological mother admitted to using cocaine again and the Juvenile Court judge
placed Byron with his maternal aunt. The biological mother was also arrested and
charged with prostitution. The foster family continued to seek custody of Byron. In
early October 1994, the Juvenile Court judge ordered the agency to place Byron and his
sister Byrae with the foster family, and seek the termination of the biological mother's
parental rights, with the foster parents first in line to adopt both children. See Editorial,
A Home for Byron: Judge Jaffe Made a Painful, But Plausible, Decision, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 11, 1994, at B2; Cindi Lash, Byron, Sister Removed from Mother's
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The serious implementation of permanency planning concepts by the
public child welfare agency and the juvenile court resulted in the
demonstration of tolerance in Byron's case. This example reveals that
the opportunity for the family to fulfill its political role in demonstrating society's tolerance for associational diversity is significantly
enhanced through implementing permanency planning concepts in the
public child welfare system.
Byron's case also reveals that this argument for permanency
planning concepts reaches well beyond a theoretical or philosophical
level. The associational diversity tolerance argument does not depend
solely on individual citizens who were involved in the public child
welfare system affecting the political system. The basis for the argument stems from the actual effects that all individual citizens have on
the society and on the political system." 2 The argument is rooted in
the shaping of the intellectual character of society to tolerate the
associational diversity necessary for the functioning of a large pluralistic democracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Permanency planning concepts have largely prevailed at the public
policy and legislative levels. 443 However, legal decision-makers
involved in child welfare proceedings have not seriously implemented
these concepts. 4 Legal decision-makers could provide leadership in
implementing permanency planning concepts, but the traditional justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts do not compel
such activist leadership. 445 Moreover, legal decision-makers seem to
Home: Relapse of Her Drug Habit Cited, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, July 1, 1994, at AI;
Cindi Lash, Mother of Child in Custody Fight Facing Charges, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Sept. 1, 1994, at Cl; Stack, Oct. 7, 1994, supra note 413, at A14; Barbara W.
Stack, Byron and His Sister are Happy with Move, the Derzacks Declare, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 11., 1994, at B1; Barbara W. Stack, Derzacks Participate in Byron
Custody Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 20, 1994, at B6; Barbara W. Stack &
Cindi Lash, Drug Program Boots Mom: Derzacks Re-enter Picture, PITTSBURGH POST-

GAZETTE, July 16, 1994, at B1; Barbara W. Stack, Ex-Foster Parent's Ok'd to See Byron
Over Objections: Judge Allows Couple Two Visits, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 20,
1994, at Al.

442. The identification of this broader basis is analogous to Dean Bollinger's
identification of a broader basis for the justification of exercising extensive
governmental restraint in the area of regulating speech activity. Bollinger asserted that
free speech protections secure much more than speech activity, in that they promote the
tolerant intellectual character necessary in a large democracy. BOLLINGER, supra note
360; see supra part V.D.1.
443. See supra part II.
444. See supra part IV.B.1.
445. See supra part IV.B.2.
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have difficulty relating to the traditional justifications based on child
development principles, social work practice concepts, economic principles, and the racial makeup of families involved in the public child
welfare system. 446
In light of the apparent failures of the traditional justifications in
real-world child welfare practice, this Article explored new justifications for implementing permanency planning concepts based on
political history, theory, and philosophy.447 Exploration of the
political roles of the family within the American political system provides additional reasons to implement permanency planning concepts.
The family's role in producing "good" citizens provides little
justification for implementing permanency planning concepts. Permanency planning concepts do not guarantee that children will be raised
in ideal family situations, or even in family situations in which the
level of care rises above a minimally adequate level. Permanent placements guarantee children long-term caretakers who are not closely
monitored by the state, rather than a family to make children "good"
citizens.
The family's roles in producing diverse individuals, and individuals
with basic associational skills, strongly justify implementing
permanency planning concepts on both a theoretical and philosophical
level. The timely placement of children in permanent family settings,
relatively free from state intrusion, provides children with the
opportunity to experience a family life that fulfills these political roles.
On a pragmatic level, American society and the American political
system do not require implementing permanency planning. The foster
care population remains relatively small, 448 and arguably, enough
children are raised in permanent family settings to ensure numerous
diverse individuals who possess basic associational skills. The public
child welfare system may have a greater effect on minority
populations. Even for these targeted populations, however, the percentage of children placed in foster care is relatively low. 44 9 Thus,
although these justifications for implementing permanency planning
concepts appear strong on both a theoretical and philosophical level,
there is little pragmatic effect on the political system.
This Article validates a final political justification for implementing
permanency planning concepts-associational diversity and associ446.
447.
448.
449.

See supra part IV.B.2.
See supra part V.
See supra note 268.
See supra note 270.
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ational power--on a theoretical, a philosophical, and a pragmatic level.
The family association provides society with the opportunity to
demonstrate tolerance for diverse associational activity. By exercising
a high degree of governmental restraint in regulating the family,
society demonstrates its commitment to tolerate diverse associations
insulated from state intrusion. Such a demonstration assists in
developing the intellectual character and the human associations
necessary for the proper functioning of a large pluralistic democracy.
Some of the most vivid demonstrations of this associational tolerance
can occur in the context of the public child welfare system. Within this
system, the government must exercise a high degree of restraint and
allow a parent who provides only minimally adequate care for a child
to maintain custody of the child. Implementing permanency planning
concepts demonstrates tolerance in cases which often receive public
attention. The usefulness of such a vivid, widely observed tolerance
for associational diversity and associational power within the political
system provides a strong, pragmatic justification for the implementation of permanency planning concepts.
Society pays a price for the vivid demonstration of associational
diversity achieved through implementing permanency planning concepts. The state occasionally exposes children to a risk of harm that
could be eliminated or reduced through more extensive state intrusion
in families. Nevertheless, exposing children to a higher risk of harm
provides significant benefits to a large, pluralistic democracy. Diverse
families produce diverse individuals, individuals who experience
intimate associational relationships outside of the state sphere from the
very beginning of life and who acquire the basic associational skills
necessary to form powerful groups outside the state sphere. All of
these outcomes lead to the associational diversity and power necessary
for the proper functioning of a large pluralistic democracy whose
designers had the wisdom to recognize that no individual or single
group could define and achieve the true public good.

